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FOREWORD 
In the erratic chaos of mainland Southeast Asia, Thai­
land appears to stand today as a tower of reasonable and 
predictable strength. Its enormous neighbor to the north is 
convulsed and at odds with its ideological colleagues while 
its radios fulminate against the imperialisms that threaten 
Thailand, whether the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations or 
the American government. To the west, Burma is experiencing 
a paroxism of neutrality and xenophobia, admitting strangers 
for only one day visits and expelling foreign residents, in­
cluding scholars and mi�sionaries who have devoted years to 
useful work in the Union. Cambodia, too, treads a neutralist 
path in the footsteps of its Prince-Prime Minister who re­
fuses to recognize two of his three neighbors. Southern 
Vietnam is described by such terms as "quagmire, nightmare, 
turmoil, torment, and tragedy", while for the north, "l'enfer" 
seems to suffice. While it is asked whether Laos is ''a 
nation or a notion", the land quietly stumbles on, ·led by an 
American supported royalty, a Communist supported royalty, 
with a "neutral" faction between, and with all parties ig­
noring international settlements designed to stabilize the 
country. 
Is Thailand indeed immune to this surrounding chaos? 
The northeastern bulge of the Kingdom, a region containing 
three times as many Lao as does Laos, is being infiltrated 
by Communist elements from across the Mekong River, according
to worried reports from Bangkok. Whatever the extent of 
insurgency in Thailand's Northeast, massive counter-insurgency
measures are being mounted by both Thai and American armed 
forces and civil agencies •. This region of Isan has long. been 
a "difficult" one from the viewpoi·nt of the central govern­
ment, an area of lambag and the source-of dissident complain­
ing voices. Now every effort will be made to maintain order 
in this outlying region and to knit it more firmly into the 
national social structure and sentiment system. 
In this study of the Northeast, Dr. Keyes provides us 
with some basis for judging what effective actions govern­
ments can take to influence the course of events in this 
region, and how effective such actions may actually be once 
they are initiated. Having studied anthropology at the 
university of Nebraska and having done advanced work in that 
V 
field and in Southeast Asian st.udies at Cornell, Dr. Keyes
spent the better part of 1962-1964 doing his dissertation 
research in Isan, ably aided by his wife, a specialist in 
Vietnamese affairs. The focus of their work was a village
near the provincial center of Mahasarakham; his task was 
to trace the cultural connections of this village outward 
through the region to the national society and polity of 
Thailand. The results of that analytical study are incor­
porated in Dr. Keyes' doctoral thesis. His situation in 
the field permitted him to gather a substantial amount of
material on Isan history, including data on the cao myang
system, and it is this material which he presents in this 
Data Paper. The Cornell Southeast Asia Program and the 
Thailand Project are grateful to Professor Keyes for the 
time he has spared from a busy schedule as a member of the 
anthropology faculty at the University of Washington to 
prepare this paper for publication. 
Lauriston Sharp
Director 
Cornell Thailand Project 
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 
March, 19 67  
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PREFACE 
Thailand's problems with ethnic minorities seem rela­
tively unimportant when compared with those of some of her 
neighbors such as Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia, or with 
those of many other plural societies. Of the ethnic 
minorities in Thailand, only the overseas Chinese are numerous 
enough to warrant any major concern. Towards them, however,
the Thai government has evolved a policy of simultaneous 
toleration and assimilation which is to be envied by any other 
country with a large Chinese minority. Thai-Malay in the 
South and the tribal groups in the North also represent po­
tential irritants in the Thai body politic. However, for the 
moment at least, good relationships between Thailand and 
Malaysia and the isolation of the tribal groups, to say nothing 
of their smallness, make possible the relative lack of concern 
which the Thai government displays towards these groups. 
Non� of this is meant to define away the problems
which the Thai government faces or ·could face in dealing with 
ethnic minorities for indeed problems do or could exist. 
Rather, I only wish to suggest that it appears possible for 
these problems to be kept within manageable proportions during 
the period when Thailand is making the transition from tra­
ditional to modern state. There does exist, however, another 
people within the Kingdom of Thailand, in some senses ethni­
cally defined, in others regionally, who appears to present
the Thai government with a far graver threat to national inte­
gration than do the more easily identifiable ethnic minorities. 
Today, imminent or potential problems of the Thai northeastern 
region dominate the thoughts of those most concerned with 
building and preserving a unified national system. 
The features of "the northeastern problem" are not sus­
ceptible to simple generalizations. Rather than ascribing 
the causes of the ''problem" to economic depression or cultural 
similarities between the Lao of Laos and Northeasterners, it 
is more relevant to examine over time the inter-group inter­
actions between Northeasterners and Central Thai or Siamese. 
Ethnic and regional identities and special interests manifest 
themselves only when "we-they" dichotomies are perceived by 
the groups themselves. ·Only after the development of such 
perceptions will other characteristics, such as economic 
features, the historical or mythical past, and cultural differ­
ences, be exploited for the purposes of attempting to advance 
the interests of one ethnic or regional group. 
Vl.l. 
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The case of northeastern Thailand presents yet a 
further complication, for the "we-they" contrast is not an 
absolute. As I have shown in another place (Keyes 1966b), 
Northeasterners identify with their local communities on 
some occasions, with their regional compatriots on other 
occasions, with the people of Laos on yet others, and 
with the Central Thai on still others. What do these al­
ternative identities imply for the political objectives of 
Northeasterners? This is the crucial question which must 
be answered in order both to understand and to cope with 
"the northeastern problem." Towards this end I have 
attempted to bring together in this monograph some infor­
mation and ideas which I hope will help to clarify how the 
people of northeastern Thailand fit within the context of 
a Thai state. 
The transliteration of Thai words in this study is
based upon the "General System of Phonetic Transcription of 
Thai Characters into Roman" as devised by the Royal Insti­
tute in Bangkok (published in Phya Anuman Rajadhon 1961: 
32-5) with the following exceptions: instead of "th" I 
write "c" and for "u'" I employ " \l •" Transcription of Lao 
and northeastern Thai words conforms as nearly as possible
to the same orthography. Common spelling of place names, 
when at considerable variance with the transliterations 
used here, will appear in parentheses when the word is 
first introduced. The only words to appear in conventional 
anglicized form will be "baht," the basic unit of Thai cur­
rency, and some Lao proper names which are so well-known as 
to make the introduction of transliterations more confusing
than helpful. 
I should like to thank the Foreign Area Training 
Fellowship Program of the Ford Foundation and the Foreign
Area Fellowship Program for supporting my field research in 
Thailand from August 1962 through August 1964. I should 
also like to thank Professors Lauriston Sharp, G. William 
Skinner, and George McT. Kahin for the valuable comments on 
various drafts of this study. To my wife, Jane, I am 
especially indebted for her critical reading of the manu­
script. Finally, I should like to thank Mrs. Susan Rapa­
port and Mrs. Linda Klages for their assistance in typing 
various versions of this study. 
Charles F. Keyes 
Seattle, Washington 
March, 1967 
Vl.l.l. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Northeastern Thailand, which on a map of Southeast 
Asia appears to jut out into what was formerly French Indo­
china (see Map I), lies for the most part between latitude 
1�0 and 18° north and between longitude 101° and 105° east. 
The Khorat Plateau, as the region is also called, is set 
off from the rest of Thailand by the Phetchabun range and 
by the smaller ranges of the Dong Phrayayen and Sainkamphaeng, 
and from Cambodia by the _ePhanom Dong Rak. 
The whole plateau is drained by the Maekhong and its 
tributaries, most notably the Mun and Chi Rivers, which flow 
towards the Maekhong. The geographical attraction towards 
the Maekhong is shared by the· lowland areas of Laos. Con­
sequently, the Khorat Plateau and the Maekhong Valley and 
tributary valleys of Laos form a natural geographical area, 
an area which is unified rather than divided by the Maekhong 
(see Map I). easternThe Annami te cordillera forms the _
boundary of this area, running down the center of middle · 
and southern Laos. 
Topographically the Northeast contrasts sharply with 
the Central Plains of Thailand. Whereas the latter area is 
a low flood plain which receives fresh ·accretions of rich 
top soil from the North each year, the Northeast is a 
plateau which tilts gently from the northwe.stern sector
where it is about 700 feet-above sea level to the southeast 
where the altitude is only about 200 feet. Except for a 
few hills in the northeastern corner, the region is pri­
marily an area of gently undulating land, most of it 
varying in altitude from 300 to 600 feet. In soil types 
and flood patterns, the Northeast also differs markedly 
from the Central Plain. 
The topography is largely one of low relief, 
and vast expanses are covered with slow 
growing forests of hardwood, on soils 
usually too infertile and insufficiently 
watered to be worth clearing for agricul­
tural uses. Most of the lowlands· and the 
1ower valley slopes, on which suitable 
depths of rain water can be held during the 
summer� are laid out in small diked fields 
planted to paddy.e· Here and there are open 
l 
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grassy plains ••• with thorny bamboo along
the creeks. These remain uncultivated,
because in the wet season they are flooded 
too suddenly and deeply to make their use 
for paddy practical and in the dry season 
they are too dry. (Pendleton 19ij3:21) 
Climatically the Northeast also differs from the 
Central Plains. The areas of the Northeast lying in the 
rain shadow of the mountain ranges dividing the Northeast 
from the rest of Thailand are the driest areas of all Thai­
land (Pendleton 1962:118). Since these mountains stand as 
a barrier to the southwesterly monsoon, the Northeast as a 
whole is more dependent for its rainfall on the cyclonic 
storms that originate over the South China Sea. In generai 
there is much more variation in rainfall from section to 
section and variability in specific localities in the North­
east than there is in the Central Region (Ibid., pp. 117-8;
Platenius 1963:9). 
The Northeast forms the largest region in Thailand,
covering 170,226 square kilometers (about 66,250 square 
miles) or comprising nearly one-third of the total land area 
of the Kingdom. Similarly, the population of the region 
accounts for about one-third of its inhabitants, the North­
east having nearly 9 million people out of a total of 26.3 
million for the whole of Thailand in 1960. This population 
ratio has held constant at least since the early part of 
this century when the first modern censuses were taken. 
Because of the classifications used in all censuses, 
it is difficult to estimate the exact ethnic composition of 
the Northeast. However, other than the bilingual Thai-Khmer 
who live in the southern provinces of the region,1 the 
Northeast contains no sizeable non-T'ai2 minority. By even 
the most conservative estimates, at least eight million of 
the 1960 population of the Northeast must be native speakers
of various T'ai dialects; the greatest majority of these 
(probably at least 95 per cent) possess linguistic and 
cultural traits which differentiate them from the Central 
Thai and relate them more closely to the Lao who live 
across the Maekhong beyond the boundaries of Thailand. 
There are indeed slight cultural and linguistic differences 
among the people occupying the geographical region dominated 
by the Middle Maekhong, particularly if comparisons are made 
between communities around Luang Prabang in the north and 
Pakse or Ubon in the south. But the people of northeastern 
Thailand and the Lao show a much higher degree of cultural 
similarity to each other than either do to such other 
neighboring groups as the "tribal" T'ai, the Thai-Khmer,
the Meo-Yao and Mon-Khmer upland peoples, or the Siamese. 
3 
The most common designation used by all the peoples
of Thailand for the northeastern region of the kingdom is 
isan.e3 Moreover, this same word is used to identify the 
people and specifically the dominant populace of the north­
eastern region. In this usage, Isan, a Pali-Sanskrit 
derived term, differs from the terms used to refer to the 
peopl� and regions of northern, central, or southern Thai­
land. Also, whereas the other regions are in some ways 
identified by a major political-cultural center to the 
extent that Bangkok is equated with the Central Plains, 
Chiangmai with
. 
the North., and Nakh9n Sithammarat with the 
T'ai-speaking South, the Northeast remains as a larger 
conception, Isan.e5 . 
The people of the Northeast sometimes refer to them­
selves as khon phynm¥ang ('natives') or as Lao. However,within recent years ne term Isan, already used by people 
of other regions to indiceate the people of the Northeast, 
has been taken up by a growing segment of the northeastern 
population to indicate their own ethnic identity. North­
easterners have begun to speak of themselves as being khon 
isan or phu isan ('Isan people'), as using phasa isan (!it., 
' Isan language1)6 and as living in ph1 isan (
1Isan region' ). ·
The increasing usage of ''Isan" by Nort easterners bespeaks
their gro�ing sense of regional/ethnic identity. 
Yet it must be stressed that this sense of Isan iden­
tity is of very recent origin. Before we can attempt to 
assess what common interests the Isan people share and what 
common objectives they wish to pursue, we need first to 
understand how a distinctive region of northeastern Thai­
land evolved. 
II. THE FORMATION OF ISAN
1 
For several centuries prior to the end of the 13th 
century the Khorat Plateau had been within the Angkor Empire 
and its population was probably predominately Khmer.a2 When 
T'ai-speaking people began to arrive in the area has yet to 
be discovered. The Thai and Lao chronicles, for example, 
bury the emergence of T' ai-speaking people in the middle 
Maekhong region in legend (Maha Sila Viravong 1964:a13-1 6,
25-26). Whatever the actual reasons may be, the appearance 
of T' ai-speaking peoples in the areas which comprise
present-day Thailand and Laos was probably not a sudden 
massive "inundation" stimulated by political events in the 
southern Chinese homeland of these people, as "' has sometimes 
been suggested. Rather, the process, as Coedes has so well 
described it, was probably one ''of gradual infiltration of 
immigrants who began by holding positions of command over
communities of sedentary agriculturalists, and ended by 
gaining control over the native peoples among whom they had 
settled and whose culture they had assimilated" (Coedes 
19 66: 102). 
The first evidence of the presence of T'ai-speaking 
peoples in the territories dominated by the Khmer appears 
on one of the bas reliefs of Angkor Wat of the 12th century 
(Briggs 195a1: 200-201), although they had already estab­
lished themselves in principalities on the northwestern 
periphery of the Angkor Empire by the 11th century. In 
the 13th century a T'ai chieftain overthrew a Khmer provin­
cial governor or commandant in an outpost of the Angkor 
Empire located at Sukhothai in north central Thailand, and 
established the first important autonomous T'ai state in an 
area formerly dominated by the Mons and Khmers. The second 
king of Sukhothai, Ram Khamhaeng (1270-1316), a_ great war­
rior, was able to extend the control of Sukhothai over most 
of north central and western Thailand, part of the penin­
sula, and the northern part of what is now northeastern 
Thailand. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
there was any sizeable T'ai-speaking population in the parts 
of northeastern Thailand controlled by Sukhothai at this 
time. 
Sukhothai, shortly after its florescence, yielded to 
two other T'ai kingdoms in the competition between the 
T'ai-speaking people and Khmer over the Khorat Plateau. At 
4 
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almost the same moment in time in the mid-14th century, the 
Lao kingdom of Lan Chang (or Lan Xang) and the Siamese 
(Central Thai) kingdom of Ayutthaya were founded. Both re­
mained important foci for political alignme�ts in mainland 
southeast Asia until the 18th century. 
Although Ayutthaya lies in what is today the heart of 
central Thailand, at that time it lay at the· edge of T' ai 
influence.3 In its expansion Ayutthaya was primarily inter­
ested in consolidating control over central and _eastern 
Thailand and in reducing the power of the Khmer and only 
secondarily, if at all, in extending its influence over 
what is today northeastern Thailand. Although theoreti­
cally successor to Sukhothai's control over the northern 
part of northeastern Thailand, Ayutthaya abandoned this claim 
at the outset in face of a stronger claim exerted by the new 
Lao kingdom of Lan Chang. 
Lan Chang originated in the smail Lao principalities 
which had appeared sometime before the 14th century in 
northern Laos. Fa Ngum, the son of the ruler of one of 
these principalities based on the capital of Muang Swa 
·elater to become Luang Prabang), was the first significant
Lao political figure of whom we have historical record-. 
According .to one version of the Lao chronicles (Maha Sila 
Viravong 1964:26-38), Fa Ngum was forced to leave his home­
land, was raised in exile at Angkor in a manner befitting a 
Khmer prince, converted to Theravada Buddhism, married the 
daughter of the Khmer emperor, and was given troops to 
effect his return to the throne of Lan.eChang and the uniting 
of the Lao peoples in a single kingdom. In addition to 
establishing the Lao kingdom of Lan Chang, he is credited 
also with introducing Buddhism to the Lao people. There is 
much in this legend (and it is not the only version) which 
requires further research in order to separate history from 
myth; but it does seem apparent that Khmer approval and/or 
support for Fa Ngum was necessary for his success in creating 
a unified Lao kingdom, for within this kingdom were in-· 
eluded peoples who had heretofore been subjects of Angkor. 
Maha Sila Viravong, in his interpretation of the Lao Annals,
suggests that the Khmer had given their support to Fa Ngum
because of their desire to see the expansion of the Siamese 
stopped. 
The Khmers had gradually fallen down to 
the point where they were unable to defend 
themselves [against T'ai expansion] •••The 
Khmer king had a strong desire to retaliate 
·against the Thais [Siamese], or, at least, 
to check their advance. Hence the Khmer 
king's kindness to Prince Fah-Ngum so that 
6 
he could use him to stop the Thai 
expansion. (Maha Sila Viravong 1964:e27) 
The traditional date of the beginning of Fa Ngum's expedi­
tion to unify the Lao, A.D. 1349, is sufficiently close to 
the dates given for the founding of Ayutthaya �nd the ini­
tiation of the first Ayutthayan attacks against Angkor 
(Wolters 1966:96-7) to lend credence to the hypothesis 
that the founding of the Lao kingdom was a consequence of 
the Khmer's own inability to prevent the emergence of 
powerful T'ai kingdoms. 
Fa Ngum started his expedition of conquest at the 
Khone Falls at the point which today divides Laos and 
Cambodia, moved up the Maekhong, bringing the peoples and 
lands on both shores under his sway, thence on to the 
Plain of Jars where he subjugated the principality of 
Xieng Khouang, and on to Luang Prabang, where he was 
crowned king. He spent some time conquering the peoples 
of northern Laos upstream on the Maekhong before moving
down to take the area which lies around Vientiane. Until 
this point, only those areas of northeastern Thailand 
lying along the Maekhong, had been brought into the new 
kingdom of Lan Chang. However, once Fa Ngum reached Vien­
tiane he decided to move on to take lands on the Khorat 
Plateau which belonged, in theory, to Ayutthaya as the 
successor to Sukhothai. An expedition in the 1350e1 s was 
successful in deposing Ayutthayan officials at Rgi-Et and 
in convincing the Ayutthayan king that the Lao were 
powerful enough to meet any military challenge which 
Ayutthaya might mount in order to protect its interests in 
the Northeast. In consequence of his conquests, Fa Ngum 
was able to bring into the kingdom of Lan Chang all of the 
parts of the Khorat Plateau except the area around Nakhqn 
Ratchasima which remained in Khmer hands.e4 
In some remarks which Maha Sila Viravong has made in 
connection with Fa Ngum's conquest lie perhaps the first 
clue to the migration of a sizeable number of Lao into 
northeastern Thailand. Fa Ngum ordered the . resettlement 
of some 20,000 Lao families around Vientiane and the north­
ern part of the Khorat Plateau. "That was the reason," 
Maha Sila Viravong claims, "why a great number of Lao 
people established themselves in the Khmer territories" 
(Maha Sila Viravong 1964:34). 
Lao, Siamese, and indigenous provincial histories 
make little mention of what took place in the Khorat 
Plateau between the middle of the 14th century and the 
early part of the 17th century. However, what information 
exists does provide certain crucial clues which make 
7 
possible some conclusions about the relationship of the re­
gion to nearby kingdoms and about cultural developments
within the region. 
First, the interest of the Lao kingdom of Lan Chang 
in the Khorat Plateau before and after the capital was 
transferred from Luang Prabang to Vientiane in 1563 had 
contracted after the expansion of Fa Ngum and was restricted 
primarily to areas lying along the shores of the Maekhong
in what are today Loei, N9ngkhai, and Nakh9n Phanom prov­
inces. In these areas, which were integral parts of the Lan 
Chang kingdom, there was but one important cultural/poli­
tical center - namely, the shrine at That Phanom which lies 
between the present northeastern towns of Nakh9n Phanom and 
Mukdhan. The unimportance of the right bank of the Maekhong 
to the Lao kingdom is corroborated in a 17th century account 
of a Jesuit missionary who had lived in Laos (Levy 1959:61). 
In short, the Lao kingdom, to the extent that it was inte­
grated at all, included only a narrow strip of the fertile 
lands lying on both shores of the Maekhong. 
Prior to the 17th century, the Siamese kingdom of 
Ayutthaya had even less interest than Lan Chang in the 
Khorat Plateau as a territory which might be brought within 
its metropolitan domains. The firs.t Siamese· foothold in 
the Northeast appears to have been established during the 
reign of King Narai (1656-1688) when the two old Khmer 
towns of M¥ang Sema and M¥ang Khorakhabura were combined 
into a single fortified outpost of Ayutthaya with the Rame 
of Nakh9n Ratchasima (cf. Manit Vallibhotama 1962:e17). 
Lan Chang and Ayutthaya, however, shared a common 
interest in maintaining the Khorat Plateau as a wide border 
area between their two kingdoms. In wars between the Lao 
and Siamese kingdoms, first under Fa Ngum in the mid-lSOO's 
(Maha Sila Viravong 1964:e50-51) and later· at the end of 
the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, the Khorat 
Plateau, by virtue of its intermediate location, formed a 
major battleground. To prevent such confrontations be­
tween the La-o and Siamese kingdoms,. there was some effort 
exerted at various times by both sides to recognize the 
Khorat Plateau as a boundary region. For example, some­
time between the late 15th and· late 16th centuries, Dan 
Sai in Loei province was officially named once and perhaEs 
twice as the demarcation point between the two kingdoms. 
Although little of the Northeast was fully incor­
porated into the Lao kingdom (and none into the Siamese 
kingdom) prior to the beginning of the 17th century, cul­
turally the region was becoming increasingly Lao as we de­
fine that ethnic tradition today. The mi-grat_ory patterns 
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of Lao into the region first mentioned in connection with 
the rule of Fa Ngum in the mid-14th century continued 
during the subsequent period. In addition to what must 
have been a constant flow of a few Lao at a time into the 
region, the Khorat Plateau seems to have been a haven for
the politically dispossessed of Laos. Maha Sila Viravong 
reports that in the last decades of the 16th century, 
large numbers of Lao around Vientiane migrated to areas 
extending from R9i-Et to Campasak in order to escape the 
rule of a usurper who had come to the throne of Lan Chang 
(Maha Sila Viravong 1964:a69-70). A history of Kalasin 
province reports a steady migration of Lao people into 
the area between 1050 and 1750 and a large migration of 
political dissidents from Vientiane in the latter part of 
the 18th century (Can�at Kalasin ••• 1957:a4-5). Campasakwas settled in a simi ar fashion in the early 18th century
while portions of the population of R9i-Et came from 
Campasak shortly after the founding of that kingdom 
(Cangwat R9i-Et ••• 195 7: 4). 
These migrations did not result merely in the sup­
planting of a pre-existent Khmer culture with a Lao cul­
ture. From the time of Fa Ngum on, the Lao had been 
borrowing many of the important elements of the Khmer 
''great tradition'' as it existed during the period of 
contact. The migrants took with them ·some form of this 
''new" Lao culture to the Khorat Plateau and once there
they continued to borrow from Khmer culture. However, in 
a linguistic sense if no other, the Lao have shown a 
greater ability to absorb the Khmer with whom they have 
come into contact than have the Khmer the Lao. In conse­
quence, the number of Khmer-speaking people remaining in• 
the Northeast has slowly diminished to its present-day. 
(1960) size of not more than a half million out of a 
total population of nine million. Even the remaining 
Khmer are bilingual and one would predict that their dis­
tinctiveness will also disappear in time. 
At the beginning of the 17th century, thus, only a 
few parts of the Northeast were fully incorporated within 
the Lao kingdom of Lan Chang and no part of the area lay
within the kingdom of Ayutthaya. The definition by these 
two kingdoms of the rest of the region as a wide border 
zone made possible the autonomy of whatever socio-political
units - villages and/or principalities - may have existed 
in the region. Culturally, the region was becoming in­
creasingly Lao, but without a court center to look to,
local variations developed perhaps to a greater extent 
than within Laos itself. Political autonomy and localism 
in the region were to become threatened only after the 
shift in the relative power of the Lao and Siamese kingdoms 
which began to take place early in the 17th century. 
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During the latter half of the 16th century both Lan 
Chang and Ayutthaya had been drawn together in the attempt 
to protect themselves against attacks by the Burmese. When 
the Burmese were finally routed at the end of the 16th 
century, both kingdoms had been weakened, although Ayutthaya 
had suffered more. According to the Thai annals, in 1610 
Lan Chang attempted to take advantage of what it considered 
to be the greater weakness of Ayutthaya and staged an 
attack against the Siamese capital (Wood 1924:61-2). How­
ever, the Siamese had recovered faster than the Lao thought, 
for the Siamese armies quickly rebuffed the Lao attacks and 
scattered the Lao forces. This event can be noted as the
turning point in Lao-Siamese relations for after this time 
the Siamese kingdom began to wax, albeit with temporary 
setbacks, while the Lao kingdom slowly began to disintegrate. 
Although in 1670, when the stele at Dan Sai in Loei 
province demarcating the boundaries between Ayutthaya and
Lan Chang was erected, much was made of the "equality" of 
Lan Chang and Ayutthaya (Maha Sila Viravong 1964:76-77), 
the real indicator of the relative relations of these two
kingdoms in regard to the Northeast was the establishment 
of a Siamese outpost at Nakh9n Ratchasima during the reign 
of King Narai (1656-1688). In fact, the king of Lan Chang 
ruling during the time of these two events, King Suraya­
wongsa (1633-1690 or 1695), was the last important king
of a unified Lan Chang. On his death, the kingdom fell 
into a period of anarchy, climaxed by the split of Lan 
Chang into the three kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, 
and Campasak early in the 18th century.a? 
The division of Lan Chang and the growing power of 
Ayutthaya brought the Khorat Plateau into focus much more 
than l1ad ever been the case in the past. The weakened 
condition of the Lao states, although not the only factor,
was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the intensi­
fication of Siamese expansion towards the Northeast which 
was to continue, with only temporary abatements, until the 
end of the 19th century. In addition to the Siamese in­
terest in the area, the division of Lan Chang also stimu­
lated Lao political interest in the interior of the Khorat 
Plateau. Although the evidence is scanty, it would appear 
that Vientiane inherited from Lan Chang territories lying
on the right bank of the Maekhong in present-day Loei, 
N9ngkhai, and Nakh9n Phanom provinces. Campasak, itself 
located on the right bank, absorbed into its kingdom 
territories upstream on the Mun and Chi rivers which lie 
today in Ubon and R9i-Et provinces (Archaimbault 19 61:562-
563; Cangwat Rgi:-Et ••• 1957:4). 
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The stage was set, thus, for northeastern Thailand 
to become a meeting place for the interests of at least 
three states - Vientiane, Campasak, and Ayutthaya. How­
ever, before such a confrontation could occur, Burma, in 
1767, again attacked and laid seige to Ayutthaya. In con­
sequence the kingdom of Ayutthaya disintegrated into five 
parts, one of wh�ch emerged at Khorat or Nakh9n Ratchasima 
(Wood 1924:254). This division was short-lived as a Thai
of Chinese descent, Taksin, was able to rally a sizeable 
military force and to piece the kingdom back together with 
a new capital at Thonburi, across the river from Bangkok. 
At the time of the Burmese attack, Vientiane was 
theoretically an ally of the Siamese, but following the 
fall of Ayutthaya, Vientiane was forced to support Burma 
or suffer attack itself. The kingdom chose to support 
Burma. Vientiane's offense to the Siamese was exacerbated 
by allowing the self-proclaimed ruler of Khorat to find 
asylum in Vientiane after Khorat fell to Taksin in 1768 
(Wood 1924:256). As punishment for disloyalty, Taksin 
ordered the invasion of Vientiane. During the punitive 
expedition, lead by General Cakkri, who was later to found 
the Bangkok dynasty, Luang Prabang aligned itself with 
Bangkok, and as the Lao historian Maha Sila Viravong puts 
it "was forc�d to accept the suzerainty of Siam" (Maha
Sila Viravong 1964:103). Vientiane, after being sacked 
and almost complete�y destroyed, was placed under a Thai 
military commander. 
campasak suffered the same fate. In 1777 Taksin
ordered Cakkri to attack Campasak for having attempted to 
expand its territories on the Khorat Plateau at the expense 
of the Siamese during the unsettled period following the 
fall of Ayutthaya. The expedition was successful and the 
ruler of Campasak was removed from his throne and sent to 
the Siamese capital. From this point on, although the 
king of Campasak was allowed to return home in 1780,
campasak became and remained a vassal of BangkoklO (cf. 
Archaimbault 1961:560-564; Wyatt 1963:19-20, 28-29). 
In consequence of these Siamese defeats of the Lao 
the kingdoms of Vientiane and Campasak became vassals of 
Bangkok. More importantly for our considerations, the 
parts of the Khorat Plateau not included within the terri­
tories of these vassals were incorporated as ''outer 
provinces" within the Siamese kingdom. 
In 1804 a new king, Cao Anu, was placed on the throne 
of Vientiane by Bangkok. For the first part of his reign,
which lasted until 1827, he proved to be a model vassal to
Thailand and seemed to be personally close to King Rama II. 11 
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After the ascension to the throne of Rama III, however, Cao 
Anu decided that he would try to restore the independence
of the kingdom of Vientiane. In 1827 he moved troops towards 
Bangkok, pretending to come to the aid of the Siamese court, 
reportedly threatened by British gunboats. He also obtained 
the support of Campasak in his expedition. ·aEarlier, the 
Siamese king had been persuaded by Cao Anu to install one 
of his own sons on the throne of Campasak and this son came 
to the aid of his father when the latter launched his attack 
on Bangkok. Together, the forces of the combin�d vassals 
presented a formidable challenge to the Siamese. Cao Anu 
was able to lead his troops as far as Saraburi in the Central 
Plains of Thailand. The Siamese king was taken completely 
by surprise, but quickly organized his troops and sent them 
against the Lao. During the year and a half it- took the 
Siamese to rout the Lao armies, there was considerable
fighting on the Khorat Plateau. The people of that region
were involved in the war by being conscripted to serve in 
the forces of one or another of the armies or by having to 
supply the troops with foodstuffs.a12 
When the Lao were finally defeated, Rama III ordered 
the complete destruction of the city of Vientiane, the de­
portation of its population to the Central Plains, and the 
public ridiculing of Cao Anu and his family in Bangkok. 
The kingdom of Vientiane was thus eliminated and the terri­
tories under both Vientiane and Campasak were reduced to the 
same status as those of the Khorat Plateau - namely, that 
of being provinces responsible to B.angkok rather than being 
vassals. Among the Lao vassals, only Luang Prabang was able 
to retain a semblance of autonomy.1 3 
In contrast to the demise of independent Lao poli­
tical power, the Cakkri dynasty of Bangkok proved to be one 
of the most stable and effective in Thailand' s history.
The strength of the dynasty, although due in no small part 
to the personal abilities of several of the kings, was en­
hanced, ironically, by the arrival of European colonialists 
in mainland Southeast Asia. The British, while stopping 
Siamese expansion to the south and west, eliminated the 
Burmese kingdom which had for so long threatened Siam. 
Even more significant was the Siamese ability to 
evolve a "response to the West" which made possible the 
preservation of independence when all Bangkok's neighbors 
fell under colonialarule. Still, Bangkok did not entirely·a
escape the territorial ambitions of the colonial powers, 
and it was in the newly incorpo:ate� Lao territ�ries that 
Siam suffered the greatest territorial losses.1 French 
colonization in Southeast Asia had the effect of halting 
Siamese expansion eastward and northeastward and of 
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establishing the present boundaries of the Thai Northeast.
•Such internationally recognized boundaries were an innova-
tion in an area where control had been based on population
rather than territory. 
In 186 2 France established itself in Cochin-China 
and continued to advance in Indochina until 19 0 7. In 186 7 
Thailand ceded, under protest, its authority over Cambodia 
( excepting the provinces of Battambang, Siemreap, Sisophon, 
and Melouprey). In 1888 Bangkok renounced any claim to 
the Sips9ng Chao Thai area in northern Vietnam. However,
the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 189 3, signed by the Siamese 
under threat from a French military ultimatum, resulted in 
Thailand's first major territorial concessions to France. 
By this treaty all of the Lao areas on the left bank of the 
Maekhong were ceded to France. Two areas on the right bank 
of the Maekhong, Sayaboury province opposite Luang Prabang 
and the province of Campasak ( called Bassac by the French), 
passe�5
to French control in consequence of the treaty of 
19 04. 
Many French officials agreed with the Siamese,
albeit for different reasons, about the essential absurdity
of the division of the Lao areas on ethnic grounds.
Several of these officials argued strongly for French 
expansion into the Khorat Plateau since the people of 
this area were also " Lao" ( cf. Lunet de Lajonqui�re 1 9 0 7). 
But the period of French colonial expansion was over and,
with the exception of a brief interlude in the Second 
World War, the boundaries dividing Laos and Thailand have 
remained unchanged since 1904. 
Although the Thai Northeast did not emerge as having
distinct geo-political identity until the beginning of the 
2 0th century, a large portion of the population of the 
region do share a common historical heritage which has 
significance for the development of northeastern regional­
ism. In consequence of migrations and assimilation, the 
vast majority of the northeastern populace is today closely 
related culturally to the Lao on the opposite bank of the 
Maekhong. Although there are slight cultural variations 
in the region due to a long period of local autonomy and 
the greater impact of Khmer culture upon the people of 
the Northeast as compared with the Lao of Laos,16 in the 
main the people of the Northeast can be grouped ethnically 
with the Lao as differentiated from the Siamese or Central 
Thai. Politically, however, the region has had a history 
of division. The areas lying along the Maekhong were 
integral, but secondary, parts of the Lao kingdom for most 
of the period between the mid-14th and the early 19th 
centuries, while much of the interior of the Khorat Plateau 
13 
was politically autonomeous. Inclusion of the region as a 
whole into one or another kingdom has occurred only in the 
pre-14th century period under Angkor (when the populace was 
itself Khmer) and since 1827  under the Siamese. Still 
these very factors of division and autonomy can be seen to 
have some relation to the subsequent Isan search for a 
distinctive identity. One of the present-day mani·festations 
of Isan regionalism is an attempt to foster a sense of eth­
nic identity in the face of Central Thai pressures without 
necessarily equating such a quest withe·ethe weak "national" 
destiny, both historically and currently, of the Lao. But 
such political objectives could emerge only after the 
people of the Northeast became aware of their common heri­
tage and identity. This awareness appeared in consequence
of the intensified interactions between Northeasterners and 
Central Thai which began with the consolidation of Siamese 
control over the North � 
III. CONSOLIDATION OF THAI CONTROL 
The Ayutthayan period can be characterized politi­
cally by the attempt of Siamese rulers to consolidate and 
maintain control over the people living within the Central 
Plains of present-day Thailand. In the four centuries 
when Ayutthaya was the capital of Siam , there were contin­
ual threats to this political objective, mainly from the 
Burmese but also from the Khmer and neighboring T' ai 
kingdoms. Howevera, the collapse of the Burmese empire at 
the beginning of the 19th century, the continued weakness
of Cambodia, and the dissolution of the Kingdom of Lan 
Chang, all occurring at a time when Siam had acquired a 
dynamic new dynasty, radically changed the traditional 
political equation. Siamese policy towards the T' ai­
speaking peoples living to the northeast and to the north 
shifted from one of seeking vassals of alliances to one of 
attempting to incorporate these people into Siam proper. 
The Siamese defeat of the Lao in the war of 182a7-8 marked 
the end of the vassal states of Vientiane and Campasak and 
led to increasing Siamese control of all the territories 
of the Khorat Plateau and the middle Maekhong region.
Towards the end of the 19th century, the old kingdom of 
Lanna or Chiangmai was also brought within the Siamese 
domains. Only Luang Prabang of all the T' ai-speaking 
kingdoms who were the northern and northeastern neighbors
of Siam remained independent, albeit as a vassal. 
The imposition of Siamese control over these areas 
was brought about gradually. At the beginning of the 19th 
century the Siamese instituted practices of indirect con­
trol which were characterized by the dispersal of power 
among a large number of semi-autonomous principalities.
For the populace of the northeastern region of Thailand, 
these methods of administration had the initial effect of 
perpetuating local autonomy. A return to this period of 
1ocalism and autonomy can be noted in some of the political 
expressions of Northeasterners at a later perioda. 
However, more crucial in the formation of Isan 
regionalism were the events at the end of the century. 
Under the pressure and stimulus of Western colonialism, 
King Culalongk9n (1868-19 10) introduced a number of re­
forms, partially based upon Western ideas and technology, 
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which aimed at more direct Siamese control over these areas. 
With these reforms and the demarcation of the boundary be­
tween Laos and Thailand established in the Franco-Siamese 
treaties of 1893 and 1904, the destiny of Northeasterners 
was cast with Thailand. After these events, any search 
for common identity among Northeasterners would be carried 
out within the context of the Thai state. 
Beginning with the reign of King Taksin ( 1767-1782), 
central Thai administration of the Lao areas, including
present-day northeastern Thailand, was based on a semi­
feudal principle whereby villagers were subject to indig­
enous elites and the elites in turn subject to Thonburi 
and, after 178 2, Bangkok. Together, elites and peasantry 
were grouped in a large number of small principalities 
termed huamSang.e
l Although there is some evidence to sug­
gest that t e structure of the huamyang in Laos and north­
eastern Thailand was based On the Lao monarchical system
( cf. "Toem Singhatthi t" 19 56: vol. l: 489; BunchuaieAtthak9n 
1962 : 4) and although four huam ang had been established onxthe Khorat Plateau during the yutthayan period,e2 the 
creation of a huam�ang system was a part of the Thai kingdom's system o control over its "outer provinces"
during the Thonburi period and for the first four and a 
half reigns of the Cakkri dynasty • .  Between 1767 and 1882,
145 huamyang were created in the Lao areasl of which about 
95-100 were located on the Khorat Plateau • ..1 These huamyang 
were divided into two basic types: major huamyang 
( huamyang fiai) which were directly responsible to Bangkok, and minor uamyang ( huamyang noi or huamyang lek) which 
were subordinate to the major huamyang. By the 1880 ' s, 
when the system was changed, there were 42 major huam*angin the Lao areas of which 2 7 were located in the Nort.eeast. 
At the head of each huamlanf was a "lord" (cao) who togetherwith the three other hig· es local officials formed a 
ruling group known as the achayasi. Below the achayasi 
was a group of officials charged with specific functions 
such as handling of the budget, management of the cao 
myang's horses, etc. 4 
Huam�ang were lower in status and smaller in size than vassa states, but were not of the same order as the 
''inner provinces" which surrounded the capital in the cen­
tral plains of Thailand. They were similar to vassals in 
that their rulers belonged to local aristocracies and 
possessed considerable autonomy. They were like the "inner 
provinces,e" however, in that the rulers ( the members of 
the achatasi) had 
to be "appointed" ( in practice, confirmed)
by the T ai throne. Vella states that they were also 
"subject to the more important obligations of ordinary 
provinces: the payment of taxes in local products and the 
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supplying of men (or a money substitute) for the corvee 
(Vella 195 7: 87) .a5 In addition, the Thai crown reserved the 
right of mediating disputes between rulers of the various 
huamiang, decision in cases involving capital punishment,and he direction or initiation of war within the area.
Finally, Bangkok required each cao m�ang or his representa­tive to come to Bangkok annually to rink the oath of alle­
giance to the king and to appear at court at the time of a 
king's coronation or funeral. Yet despite these formal 
restrictions, the absence of permanent representatives of 
the Thai government in the Lao areas and the difficulties 
in communication and transportation meant that the cao 
myang and the achayasi could rule their huamyang without 
too much regard for Bangkok. 
This situation in which local autonomy was circum­
scribed only minimally by Thai control continued until 
the Thai court began to fearathat the expansion of British 
and French colonialism might endanger their hold over the 
huam�ang. After successfully installing a central Thai roya commissioner at Chiangmai in north Thailand in 1874, 
the Thai government instituted a system of royal commis­
sioners for all of the Lao areas as well (Vella 1955:344). 
In 1882 a royal commissioner in charge of the Lao huamyang 
was stationed at Campasak ("Toem Singhatthit" 1956 : voI. 1: 
46 4) and in 1890 Lao huamyang were grouped into four divi­
sions, each with its own royal commissioner (Bunchuai
Atthak9n 19 6 2:a6 9).a6 
The Franco-Siamese treaty of 1893, which resulted 
in the cession of territories on the left bank of the Mae­
khong to the French, provided an important reason for the 
broadening of the administrative reforms which King Cula­
longk9n had begun in the previous decade. In the first of 
a series of major governmental reform laws proclaimed in 
189 3 the administration of all huamyang which had formerly
been under the jurisdiction of several quasi-ministries 
was centralized in a Ministry of Interior. The same 
proclamation created the new administrative unit of monthon 
or ''acirclesa'' of which there were 18 for the whole country. 
These were designed to bridge the gap between the central 
government and the huam�anf• Monthon were administe,ed by
Ministry of Interior of icials appointed by Bangkok. 
This administrative reform carried the Thai government a
step closer to direct control over the "outer provinces" 
including those in northeastern Thailand. 
Direct control was further extended in several 
other reforms instituted by King Culalongk9n before his 
death in 1910. Major huamyang became "districts" (amphoe) 
on a par with the provinces and districts of the Ceniral 
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Region of the kingdom. The cao myan� became "governors" 
and, together with the other provincial and district offi­
c•ials, were incorporated into the Thai civil service. Their 
salaries came from the central government rather than from 
a portion of tribute money as had heretofore been the case. 
Although the changes were initially terminological, the 
groundwork was laid for the reduction of the autonomy of 
the huamyang and their rulers and the dissolution of the 
differences between inner and outer provinces. 
The transformation of the kingdom from a partially 
centralized, partially decentralized system into a unified 
system was not completed in the reign of Culalongk9n. How­
ever, he had established the formal structure of the new 
system which his successors used as a basis for their 
governing of the country. As a cao myani passed away in one 
of the northeastern or other "outer provinces,a" he was re­
placed not in accordance with the traditional method whereby 
provincial officials chose the new ruler (usually from 
among the close relatives of the old ruler), but instead 
through an appointment made by the Ministry of Interior 
(Bunchuai Atthak9n 1962:75). By 1932, when Thailand became 
a constitutional monarchy, the imposition of a centralized 
administrative system on the whole country and the incor­
poration of all provincial and district officials into a
national bureaucracy had been nearly completed. 
For the northeastern region of Thailand the reforms 
leading to the centraliazation of the bureaucracy and admini­
stration had an impact which was relevant to the later de­
velopment of northeastern regionalism. Although there is
little evidence, it seems highly likely that many of the 
traditional cao myang rulers with their local roots and 
local bases of power were replaced by Central Thai officials 
with more ties to Bangkok than to the provinces and districts 
to which they were posted.8 To the extent that this prac­
tice was followed, Northeasterners experienced for the firsta· 
time the subordination of local political interests to Cen­
tral Thai objectives. The fact that some of the dispossessed 
members of the traditional northeastern aristocracies later·
sought to re-establish their power positions through election 
as provincial representatives in the parliamentary period 
(see below) indicates that at least some manifestations of 
political discontent can be traced to the thwarting of the 
political ambitions of local Isan leaders as a consequence 
of the extension of Thai control. 
Whatever the magnitude of the displacement of tradi­·
tional rulers in the Northeast may have been, the admini­
strative reforms did result in a shift of the locus of all 
important political powers from the huamyang to Bangkok. 
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Provincial and district officials, no matter whether Cen­
tral Thai or Northeastern in origin, were now subject to a 
bureaucratic code which had been developed in Bangkok. As
civil servants, their responsibility was to Bangkok rather 
than to the local populace and their careers depended upon
their conforming to the demands and pressures of the Thai 
rather than the local system. The centralizing of the 
bureaucracy, thus, had the effect of endowing the separa­
tion between the rulers and ruled with an ethnic overtone.
Northeasterners began to feel that political power was the 
prerogative of the "Thai" rather than of themselves. 
The extension of Thai political control over the 
Northeast was inexorably connected with the creation of 
modern communication and transportation networks which was 
also begun in the last decades of the 19th century. With­
out more rapid means of communication and transportation 
between Bangkok and outlying regions, the political reforms 
of King Culalongk9n could never have been so effective in 
breaking down the autonomy and isolation of the northeastern 
huamyang. Traditionally, messages between the government 
and provincial outposts had been carried by relay runners 
on horseback or by fast boat. During the reign of King 
Culalongk9n the Ministry of Interior maintained a schedule 
which specified that messages between Bangkok and N9ngkhai 
took 12 days, between Bangkok and Ubon, 12 days, and between 
Bangkok and Luang Prabang, 17 days going and 13 days in 
returning ( Damrong 196 0 :58). The normal movement of people 
and goods was far slower. According to one report in 1895 
it took about three weeks to travel by ox cart from N9ngkhai 
to Khorat and another eight or nine days to travel from 
Khorat to Bangkok ( Smyth 1895:83 and 93). Travel by
water, which was important in connecting the north with the 
Central Plains, served in the Northeast only to connect 
internal points on the Mun, Chi, or Maekhong or to connect 
northeastern communities with other communities on the left 
bank of the Maekhong. 
Trading patterns between the Central Plains, and, in 
particular, Bangkok, and the Northeast were altered radi­
cally with the completion of the first rail line to Khorat 
in 1900. Whereas the shipment of goods had formerly taken 
at least eight or nine days to go from Khorat to Bangkok, 
it could now be accomplished in a day. The traditional 
routes within the Isan region were, of course, unmodified 
by the rail connection between Bangkok and Khorat, but the 
speed with which goods could reach Khorat from Bangkok 
facilitated the introduction into the Isan region of items 
previously too expensive or too perishable to transporta. 
By 1928  one section of the northeastern rail line had been 
extended to Ubon and by 1933 the other section had reached 
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Kh9nkaen (Thailand, Ministry of Communication 1947 :a11-13) . 9 
Automobile transport made its first appearance in the North­
east sometime in the 1920 's  but did not expand rapidly 
until after the Second World War. 
Modern communication connections between the North­
east and Bangkok were inaugurated at about the same time as 
the beginning of railway construction. The Post and Tele­
graph Office was first established in 1883 .  According to 
a French official, there were two major northeastern tele­
graph lines in 1907, each branching out from Khorat, the 
terminus of the Bangkok-Khorat linea. The first went north 
to N9ngkhai and the second went east to Ubon, with a section 
going from Buriram to Campasak (Lunet de Lajonquiere 19 07: 
283) . Since then, telegraph services have been extended to 
every district in the Northeasta. 
Both the extension of Thai political control and the 
expansion of communication and transportation networks 
helped to bring Northeasterners into more intimate contact 
with the Central Thai and to make them aware of Bangkok as 
an economic and political focusa. However, neither set of 
innovations were as important as the educational reforms,
also begun by King Culalongk9n, for making Northeasterners 
aware of their inclusion within a Thai nation-state. 
Traditionally, village education throughout Thailand had 
been in the hands of Buddhist monks attached to the local 
templesa. Education was, thus, locally circumscribed and 
dependent upon the training and knowledge of the monk­
teachers.a10 King Culalongk9n felt that to modernize Thai­
land and to inculcate in the populace of the kingdom an 
awareness of their national heritage, the educational 
system, like administration, must be centralized. In 1871 
he estabalished the ''Palace System' '  in which princes were
given Western-type educationa. After his success in this 
endeavor, he decided, in 1885, that the government should 
extend "modern" education to the whole countrya. In 1889 a
Ministry of Education was founded with the extremely able 
Prince Damrong as its first heada. Just before King Cula­
longk9n died in 19a10 a conference was held in which it was
decided that primary education should be made compulsory 
throughout the country . This idea was actually put into 
law in the Primary Education Act of 1921, by which all 
children in the country were required to spero five (later
reduced to four) years studying in a national program of 
education. 
Although the tasks of training secular teachers to 
replace the traditional monk-teachers, of establishing 
schools which would be within walking distance of every 
child, and of enforcing the teaching of all parts of the 
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government-determined curriculum have yet to be fully com­
pleted, by 1934 the dream of Culalongk9n had nearly become 
a fact. For the northeastern peasantry the required parti­
cipation in four years of government education resulted in 
every Northeasterner learning about Thai geography, Thai 
history, and Thai language. Interspersed throughout their 
educational experience, these same children are taught to 
respect and honor country, king, and religion. An anthro­
pologist who worked in a remote Thai-Lue village in the 
extreme north of Thailand has suggested the importance of 
education in bringing traditionally isolated people into a 
Thai frame of reference. 
It is our strong impression that in areas 
like Chiengkham where officials are estranged,
the draft widely scattered, official radio 
broadcasts largely irrelevant to village 
life, and government services almost non­
existent, the local elementary school is 
overwhelmingly the main source of national 
consciousness and loyalty. Lessons in the 
national language, in Thai history, religion, 
and geography--however superficial and im­
perfectly remembered--have a profound effect 
on village life (Moerman 1961:80). 
In another context, I reached similar conclusions with re­
gard to a village in the central part of northeastern 
Thailand (Keyes l966a:a140-l91). The identification of 
Northeasterners with the Thai king, a most critical and 
crucial element in a sense of Thai citizenship, has been 
brought about more through the impact of national education
than through the impact of any other type of national pro­
gram. 
The educational reforms, like the administrative · · 
reforms and the expansion of communication and transporta­
tion networks, served to bring Northeasterners into much 
closer contact with Central Thai culture and society and 
to make the Northeasterners aware that their future would 
be affected by decisions in Bangkok. At the same time,
these innovations also began to make Northeasterners rea·1-
ize that their local culture and patterns of living were 
considered inferior to those of Central Thai. Such was 
apparent in the attitudes of the new government officials 
and in the content of the educational curriculum. As the 
impact of direct Thai control increased, Northeasterners
began to develop ambivalent attitudes towards Central Thai 
culture. On the one hand, they resented its threat to 
their own local ways; on the other hand, they admired it 
for its association with higher status and with the newly 
accepted "sacred" focus of their universe, the Thai king. 
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Such peasant ambivalences towards their own local cul­
ture and elite culture are characteristic of most peasant
societies. What was to make northeastern Thailand different 
was the recognition by Northeasterners that their "local" 
culture and values were shared by a large proportion of the 
Isan populace •e This recognition did not follow immediately
.upon the consolidation of Thai control in the area. Rather,
the first hints of the merginge- of local interests in larger 
regional interests appearede· in consequence of the activities 
of northeastern representatives during the period of parlia-
mentary experiment in 19 32-47.. 
IV . SEARCH FOR POLITICAL IDENTITY 
The most crucial date in recent Thai political his­
tory is undoubtedly 1932, for in that year a group of civil 
servants and disaffected military elements in Bangkok led a 
successful cotF d'etat against the Thai throne and estab­lished a cons itutional monarchy . The most important con­
sequence of the change in government insofar as the devel­
opment of political identity in the Northeast was concerned 
was the creation of a parliamente. For the first time pro­
vincial leaders were given an opportunity to express them­
selves in a national forum on issues affecting the future 
of both their home areas and the nation as a whole. Within 
this context representatives from the Northeast were to 
assume particularly significant roles . Even before the 
experiment in parliamentary democracy was begun, however, 
the ctuF against the throne ushered in a brief period of  uncer ainty about the political future of Thailand which 
affected Northeasteerners as well as the other peoples of  
the kingdom. Some events in the Northeast during this 
period suggest, although not very strongly, the first stir­
rings of regional dissent. 
In 1933 a royalist military leader, Prince Bow9radet,
led troops under his command from the Khorat garrison into 
rebellion against the government of the coup leaders. A 
few indigenous leaders in the Northeast supported this re­
bellion {Wilson 1962 : 223). Howeever, for the most part,
northeastern officials were loyal to the new government and 
even provided police and boy scouts to help the government 
round up the ragtag remnants of Bow9radet ' s  troops who had 
been dispersed in the Isan lountryside (Wilson 1962 : 222-3;  
Bunchuai Atthak9n 1962: 96). 
In the aftermath of the coup and the unsuccessfule. 
Bow9radet rebellion, the new government in Bangkok made a 
large number of arrests of people suspected of being in­
volved in anti-goevernment activities. Some of those 
arrested in the Northeast were accused, somewhat paradoxi­
cally, of being " Communists . "  One individual so charged,
Yuang Iamsila, later to be an MP from Ud9n, maintained 
that he did not even know at the time what Communism was 
{Wilson 1962 : 222-3). Whatever the reason for the "Commu­
nist'' charges, they do reflect the first occurrence of 
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suppression of northeastern political leaders by the central 
government for alleged left-wing activities.ela 
One source has advanced the not very plausible hypoth­
esis that governmental fears of " Communist'' activity amonge. 
Northeasterners at this time had arisen because of the in­
volvement of some Northeasterners in the embryonic revolu­
tionary activities of Vietnamese refugees in northeastern 
Thailand. This linkage was made by Thompson and Adloff in 
their book on The Left-Wing in Southeast Asia : 
By early May 1934 leaflet distribuetion 
on the part of a group calling its members 
the "Committee of Young Siam" began to be 
concentrated in the northeast provinces. 
It was there that political refugees from 
Indochina were grouped, and the cells 
formed in Sakol Nakon and Bichitr were 
suamsed to be closely alli�d to similar·e
Cantonese and Tonkinese groups. Fear of 
this tie-up undoubtedly accounted for the 
severity of the prison sentences imposed
at this time by the Thai courts on a number 
of Annamite revolutionaries. (Thompson
and Adloff 1950 : 56 )  
That Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast at this time 
were being wooed to an anti-colonial revolutionary cause is 
certainly true. That this cause was then also "Communist" 
is more questionable. Political cadres• had foellowed the 
Vietnamese refugees into the Northeast and had joined them 
in their centers at Ud9n, Sak9n Nakh9n, Nakh9n Phanom,
N9ngkhai, Mukdhan, and That Phanom (cf. Le Manh Trinh 1962·: 
118). Ho Chi Minh himself, under the alias of Thau Chin,2 
had spent from 1928 to 193 0  working among these people,
particularly in Ud9n and Sak9n Nakh9n where he established 
cells and Vietnamese schools ( Le  Manh Trinh 19 6 2 ) .  Ho is 
reported to have told Vietnamese in Ud9n: 
Viet Nam is a colony, Thailand is a semi­
colony. Viet Nam is oppressed by the 
French. Thailand has been bullied by
the French into signing several unequal
treaties. We detest the French, the 
Thai do not like them either. Moreover, 
Thaieland and Viet Nam are neighboring
countries. It's certain .ethat the Thais 
have sympathy for the anti-French move­
ment of the Vietnamese. (Le Manh Trinh 
19 6 2  : 121-2 ) 
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Yet, despite such words of encouragement, it is doubtful 
that the Vietnamese proselytized very much among their 
northeastern neighbors. For the most part the Vietnamese 
community in the Northeast has retained the characteristics 
of a ghetto or caste group and Vietnamese have restric3
ed 
their interactions with Northeasterners to the .market. 
The few sporadic manifestations of real or apparent
political dissent that appeared in the Northeast following
the houp of 1932 probably reflected more the instability
inat e country as a whole than they did an emerging re­
gionalism. This instability was short-lived as the govern­
ment in Bangkok quickly restored order throughout the king­
dom and moved on to define the new directions which the 
state would take under their aegis. 
The government of the "Promoters,a" as the members of 
the coup group were called, continued the trend towards 
bureaucratic and administrative centralization which had 
been begun by King Culalongk9n. In 1932 the eighteen mon­
thon of the country were reduced to ten and in 1933 the 
monthon system was abolished (Landon 1939:45) . The latter 
move signified that the government now considered the prov­
inces and districts of the country to be sufficiently inte­
grated within a national administrative system to obviate 
the need for an intermediary level of government between 
nation and province. For the Northeast, the last vestiges 
of huamyang political autonomy had been eliminated. 
The most important innovation of the new government
was the creation of a national parliament with elected 
representatives from every province. This institution pro­
vided the first mechanism in Thai history whereby local and 
regional interests of the country could be represented at 
the political center of the kingdom. The Thai parliament 
has had somewhat of a chequered history since its founding 
in 1933. It has been disbanded and reorganized, used and 
abused by successive prime ministers. However, when extant 
it has assumed a special significance for the representa­
tives from the Northeast. 
The first general election in Thailand occurred in 
November-December of 1933 and successive elections were 
held in the pre-war years in 1937 and 1938. Political 
parties were illegal for all these elections and only half 
of the members were elected, while the other half were ap­
pointed. Consequently, the Promoters were in little danger
of a threat by parliamentary opposition to their hold on 
the reins of government. However, the period between 1932 
and the war was marked by competition among the leaders of 
the 19 32 coup, and the political allegiances of all elected 
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representatives tended to coalesce around one or the other 
of these leaders. Although Phraya Phanon became Prime 
Minister in 1933 and remained so until 1937  , Pridi Phanomyong 
(Luang Pradit Manutham) and Phibun Songkhram became the most 
important figures around whom the majority of MP' s grouped 
themselves.a· 
Pridi, a son of a peasant family in Ayutthaya, was 
the main intellectual force among the Promoters. In his law 
training in France he apparently had found the s.ource of 
his ideas about the construction of a new Thailand. Although
some of his ideas appeared in the permanent constitution of 
1932, they were most apparent in an Economic Plan proposed
in 1933 which envisaged the nationalizing of both industry 
and farms thereby making all farmers employees of the state. 4 
The plan was subsequently branded as " Communist" and Pridi 
was forced to leave the country for a short time. Although 
he was later exonerated and returned to a position of power 
within the government, Pridi's plan was thoroughly dis­
credited and was never proposed formally again. Nonetheless,
some of the ideas which sought to introduce a radical method 
for economic development were later to reappear in the 
solutions proposed by post-war Isan represe·ntatives as 
solutions to the economic difficulties of the region. 
Pridi's political ambitions suffered an apparent
major setback with the rejection of his economic plan, but 
by 1934 he had not only returned from abroad, but he also
held the important post of Minister of Interior. His 
strength was a1&0ng the " liberal" group in the Promoters, a 
faction made up in large part of young civilians who had 
studied abroad as Pridi himself had done. His influence 
spread not only among a large number of elected representa­
tives in the National Assembly but also to others of the 
emerging elite who had attended Thammasat University (the 
University of Moral and Political Sciences) of which he was 
the founder and first rector. 
Pridi's major adversary in the competition for poli­
tical power was the young military officer, Phibun Songkhram. 
Phibun, also of Central Thai peasant background, had studied 
military science in France. His strength lay in his popu­
larity among military officers who had been impressed by his 
leadership of the forces which suppressed the Bow9radet 
rebellion. His military orientation and his own political
ambitions were the main basis for the approach he adopted 
towards the type of government which he felt Thailand should 
have. People rallied around him not because of his ideologi­
cal position but because of the belief that he would be a 
powerful ruler of the country. 
26 
The political struggle between Pridi and Phibun was 
projected against the backdrop of the National Assembly.
Many of the appointed Assemblymen were military officers 
who sided with Phibun. But it is the elected representa­
tives in whom we are most interested since among them were 
the few Northeasterners who had become involved in national 
politics. One type of Isan MP included the descendants of 
old cao myang families who sought election as a means of 
perpetuating their influence in their home areas and for 
seeking access to power which had been denied them after 
the administrative reforms were implemented. How many Isan 
representatives of this type there were is difficult to 
determine. I have been able to identify two definitely -
Th9ngmuan Attak9n from Mahasarakham and Th9ngdi na Kalasin 
(Kwang Th9ngthawi) from Kalasin - and the names cum titles 
of at least three others suggest that they too may have 
been of this type. Associated with these MP'as were a few 
local provincial and district officials who left their 
positions in the civil service to seek national office. 
Phraya Sarakham Khanaphiban (Anong Phayakham), an ex­
governor of the province of Mahasarakham who was elected to 
the National Assembly in 1933 (Bunchuai Atthak9n 1962 : 90-2, 
96 ) ,  exemplifies this type of representative.5 These 
deputies attached themselves to another representative of
similar background who was later to become one of the most 
important figures in national policies - Khuang Aphaiwong. 
Nai Khuang himself was a descendant of the traditional 
ruling family of Battambang which had been ceded to the 
French by the treaty of 1907 and is today a part of Cam­
bodia. These representatives, and others of like mind, 
tended to be conservative since their own way of life was 
rooted in the traditional past. 
The most vocal type of Isan MP was the Northeasterner 
who through education had risen from a relatively humble 
background and whose ties were still strong in the country­
side of his constituency. Among the most prominent parlia­
mentary supporters of Pridi, men such as Thawin Ud9n (R9i­
Et), Th9ng-In Phuriphat (Ubon), Tiang Sirikhan (Sak9n
Nakh9n), and Caml9ng Daor�ang (Mahasarakham), were North­
easterners of this variety. I would suggest that one of 
the reasons why such men committed themselves to the 
"liberal" faction stemmed from the fact that these men had 
1ess of an investment in the traditional Thai social 
system than did MP' s from the Central Plains or representa­
tives who belonged to the old provincial or national 
aristocracies. On the contrary, they had much to gain by 
the greater demo�ratization of the system. Their political 
strength did not lie with whom they knew in Bangkok, at 
least not initially, but with the peasantry who had elected 
them. To enhance their positions they needed to espouse, 
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dramatically if possible, programs and policies which would 
both increase their popularity in the countryside and bring 
them to the attention of the national leadership. 
During the 1933-38 period Th9ng-In Phuriphat (Ubon) 
established himself as the most persistent critic of the 
government. In 1935 he and two other members filed a vote 
of no-confidence in the State Council over a combination of 
issues including increased military involvement in civil 
government, an opium scandal> and the alleged ine-fficiency
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Thompson 1941 : 90 ;  
Bangkok Times, October 16, 1935)  . In 1937 he led a parlia­
mentary protest over the inadequacy of funds allocated for
education and public works as compared with the defense 
budget (Thompson 1941 : 93) . In the same year he also demanded 
an explanation from the government of a speech by a yoW1g 
military officer who had demeaned the elected MP' s (Landon
1939 : 50)  . Shortly thereafter he requested permission to 
found a political party which would have branches throughout 
the country (Landon 1939 : 50)  . However , the CoW1cil of 
Ministers rejected the request on the basis that the time 
was not yet suitable for such (Landon 1939 : 5 0 ;  Siam Chronicle, 
May 20, 1941) .  
In 1938 PhibWl became Prime M.inister after the retire­
ment of Phraya Phanon. Although Pridi and some of the 
other liberal "Promoters" were not excluded from Phibun's 
first government, they began to become dismayed at his 
tendency towards military dictatorship and ultra-nationalism. 
In keeping with these themes, in 1941 Phibun led the country 
into a brief war with the French in Indochina for the purpose 
of regaining some of the territories which had been lost to 
France. The war was ended inconclusively due to interven­
tion by the Japanese who foisted mediation on the two 
belligerents. Indochina, which was in the hands of the 
Vichy French and nominally an ally of the Axis powers, had 
no alternative but to accept Japanese efforts. As a result 
of the negotiations, the lands on the right bank of the 
Maekhong (Sayaboury province and the area around Campasak) , 
as well as certain portions of Cambodia ceded to the French 6in the treaties of 1904 and 1907 , were restored to Thailand. 
The war, and the irredentist atmosphere in which it 
was fought, had an impact on the people of the Northeast. 
The theme was struck by officials in Bangkok that "racially'' 
the peoples in the territories claimed by Thailand belonged
within the Thai kingdom.a? 
Northeasterners who heard such proclamations were thus 
made aware that Bangkok considered that Isan and Lao were 
ethnically inseparable. Since the battles took place along 
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the Lao-Northeast Thailand border, the Thai troops who 
fought the war were stationed in large numbers in the 
Northeast. Moreover, large numbers of Central Thai offi­
cials went to the Northeast, some pe,rhaps for the first 
time, to inspect the war preparations and defenses. Through
these actions even peasants along the Maekhong were made 
aware of the tenuous nature of the border drawn between 
them and the people of Laos. The Thai prosecution of the 
war underscored the fact that decisions about the future 
of the Northeast lay with the Bangkok government. 
Shortly after the conclusion of this war the Japanese 
began their military advance into Southeast Asia. After 
offering token resistance the Phibun government agreed to 
become an ally of the Japanese. This decision led Pridi to 
resign from the government and to take up the post as Regent
for the young King Ananda who was studying in Switzerland. 
With Pridi's departure the military under Phibun assumed 
almost total control of the government, although the Parlia­
ment was permitted to continue. Opposition to the govern­
ment, although small at the outset, was now unified since 
Pridi had broken with Phibun. In Parliament followers of 
both Pridi and the more conservative Khuang under the 
leadership of several northeastern MP'as joined in opposi­
tion to the military. 
As the war progressed Pridi became the leader within 
Thailand of a secret Free Thai Movement which opposed both
the alliance with Japan and Phibun's military government. 
This movement included many prominent Isan MP'as.a8 One 
important facet of the Free Thai activities was its con­
nection with the anti-Japanese underground in Indochina. 
Although it is difficult to document, the events which 
transpired after the war suggest that certain of these Isan 
members of the Free Thai Movement must have established 
their close ties with the followers of Ho Chi Minh and 
Prince Suphanuwong during the wara. 
In July 1944 Phibun's government fell on the issue of 
transferring the capital from Bangkok to the hinterland 
province of Petchabun. Early in 1944 Phibun had begun to 
conscript labor to build a road to Petchabun with disastrous 
results.a9 Coast has provided a good summary of the situa­
tion and the consequent parliamentary defeat of Phibun ' s  
government: 
After a couple of months there was 
serious trouble with the labor force. 
Men were dying fast of Malaria, which 
was of a vicious variety in this un­
wholesome area. By July, it became 
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necessary to take strong measures and 
Phibun drafted a bill for the compulsory 
conscription of workers on this national 
project. He presented the bill personally 
to the Assembly, only to find that the 
overwhelming majority of the membe�s were 
against him. This reverse came about 
largely because he had filled the Assembly 
with military members [as appointed members 
of Parliament] who had always supported him, 
and at this time of national emergency most 
of them were outside Bangkoke. Led mainly
by Nai Thong-Indr Buripat [Th9ng-In Phuri­
phat, MP from Ubon] and Nai Tieng Sirikhand 
[Tiang Sirikhan, MP from Sak9n Nakh9n], two 
staunch Pridi men, the Opposition blocked 
the Premier's scheme . (Coast 195 3:26) 
In August, Khuang Aphaiwong, who was later to become the 
main leader of the Democrat Party independent of both Phibun's 
and Pridi's factions, became Premier and immediately appointed 
a committee to investigate the "Phetchabun Scheme. "  The 
chairman of this committee, F9ng Sitthitham (Ubon), was 
joined by several other Northeasterners including Caml9ng 
Daorliang ( Mahasarakham), Liang Chaiyakan C Ubon) ,·e and Tiang 
Sirikhan (Sak9n Nakh9n).elO 
. ,
In the period between July 1944 and the coup d'etat of 
November 8 1947, although various people were in name Prime 
Minister,11 Pridi held the real power . An opposition to 
Pridi did begin to appear among some of his former associates 
in the Free Thai Movement,however, after the 1946 elections 
many of the former Free Thai men who remained loyal to Pridi,
including such prominent northeastern MP's as Caml9ng Dao­
r�ang, Thawin Ud9n, Th9ng-In Phuriphat, and Tiang
1�
irikhan,
helped organize the Sahachip (Cooperative) Party. - Those 
who broke with Pridi, including F9ng Sitthitham, Liang 
Chaiyakan, and Kwang Th9ngthawi among the northeastern repre-
sentatives, joined with Nai Khuang Aphaiwong, Seni Pramot 
and his brother Kh�krit in forming the Democrat Partye. 
Although it is misleading to suggest for these two factions 
ideological labels which have currency in the West, there 
was definitely a difference in political philosophy between
theme. Pridi and his followers were anxious to have Thailand 
associate with, and perhaps even lead, the national forces 
which were beginning to appear in Indonesia, Burma, and 
Indochinae. They were also willing to consider introducinge· 
new, perhaps even radical, ideas, particularly in the eco­
nomic sphere, to the unfinished task of modernizing the 
kingdom. The Democrats, on the other hand, tended to be 
more concerned with preserving the cultural continuity and 
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many traditional institutions of the kingdom. In conse­
quence, the Democrats were less concerned with relationships 
with neighboring peoples and more cautious regarding plans 
for modernization. These two positions, in their various 
subsequent guises, have both held attractions for the popu�a,
lace of the Northeast as well as for the rest of the country. 
Both factions have, at least publicly, remained committed 
to parliamentary rule. Unfortunately, however, neither 
have been permitted sufficient time in office to develop 
effective means for implementing their ideas, for the 
military, with its alternative commitment to dictatorial 
or oligarchical rule, has repeatedly exerted itself to 
eliminate the progress made by the other two factions 
towards parliamentary rule. 
However, for the brief three-year period just pre­
ceding and following the end of the Second World War, the 
members of the anti-military groups did rule the coW1try. 
During this period, a number of northeastern representa­
tives in the National Assembly rose to positions of major 
importance in the government. Caml9ng Daor�ang (Mahasara­
kham) was made a cabinet member, acting for the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, in the first Aphaiwong cabinet 
(1944-5), a Minister without Portfolio, and later Assistant 
Minister of Commerce in the Thamrong cabinet (1946-7).
Liang Chaiyakan (Ubon) was a Minister without Portfolio in 
the second Aphaiwong cabinet (January-March 1946). Th9ng­
In Phuriphat (Ubon) was first a Minister with Portfolio and 
then Deputy Minister of the Interior in the first Aphaiwong 
cabinet and a Minister of Industry and Minister of Communi­
cation under Thamrong. Tiang Sirikhan (Sak9n Nakh9n) was
in the cabinet of Seni Pramot (September 1945-January 1946) 
and a Minister without Portfolio and later Assistant Mini­
ster of the Interior in the Thamrong government. Thawin 
Ud9n (R9i-Et) was made a Senator and in April 194 7  was 
appointed Manager of the government-owned Thai Industrial 
Development Corporation. 
The theme which dominated the first years of the 
postwar period was the attempt by the Thai government,
under Pridi' s guiding hand, to regain international 
acceptability in lieu of the low esteem in which Thailand 
had been held during the war for its alliance with Japan. 
In addition Pridi was also interested in seeing Thailand 
play a crucial role in the drama of resurgent nationalism 
which spread across Southeast Asia in the immediate post­
war period. 
Pridi had very definite ideas about the 
role that Thailand should play in South­
east Asian affairs. While maintaining 
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good official relations with the vic­
torious Allies, particularly with the 
United States, Pridi also was ambitious 
for Thailand to become the leader of 
independent nations in this strategic 
area of Asia. He foresaw that national­
ist forces in Burma, Indonesia, and 
Indochina would one day force the weakened 
colonial powers to recognieze the futility 
of trying to rule these areas in the pre­
war manner, and that it was only a matter 
of time until the powers were forced to 
grant them independencee. Pridi believed 
that Thailand's long history of independ­
ence and political stability and its 
success in dealing with European powers 
made it a natural leader among these 
emergent nations. It was an ambitious 
vision, but Pridi was an extraordinary 
person who seemed to have unlimited faith 
in his ability to lead Thailand and South­
east Asia in the new postwar erae. 
(Nuechterlein 1965:94) 
To advance this objective Pridi all.owed Bangkok to become a 
place in which representatives of the Indochinese independ­
ence movements could contact arma!�nt supplies and present 
their cases to the outside world. In May 1947 he also 
tried, with little success, to mediate the dispute between 
the French and the Viet Minh. While in Paris on this 
mission, he hit upon the idea of a Southeast Asian Union 
which would include Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and V·ietnam 
(cf. Coast 1953:38; Nuechterlein 1965:94-5 ) � · Although the 
French were unsympathetic to such an idea, Pridi persisted, 
and in September 1947 an organization designed to promote 
this end, the Southeast Asia League, was founded. The list 
of officers of the League is extremely interesting in that 
it reveals the connections between several of the important 
northeeastern politicians and leaders of the independence 
movements in Indochina. The President (Tiang Sirikhan, MP 
from Sak9n Nakh9n) and the Public Relations Officer (Sen.
Thawin Ud9n, a former MP from R9i-Et)  were both well-known 
Isan political leaders, while the Vice President (Tran Van 
Giao ) and Treasurer (Le Hi) were important figures in the 
Viet Minh, and the General Secretary (Princee· Suphanuwong ) 
was to become the leader of the Pathet Lao.e14 
What the Southeast Asia League might have accomplished
is purely speculative, however, for it only survived two 
months. While Pridi was pursuing his desires to make Thai­
land a significant force outside its borders, events within 
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the kingdom had greatly undermined his position. In June 
19 46 the young King Ananda died of a gunshot wound under 
mysterious circumstances. Rumors abounded that the King
had been assassinated and that Pridi was in some way re­
sponsible.15 The inability of an investigating group to 
come up with definite conclusions as to the cau_se of death 
coupled with widespread corruption in the Thamrong govern­
ment helped to discredit Pridi and to make possible the 
military coup of November 19 47. Pridi , Thamrong , and some 
of their supporters (although , apparently no Northeasterners)
fled the country and many of those who remained were arrested 
or went into hiding. Although the coup had been managed by 
the military with Phibun as at least its nominal sponsora, 
Khuang Aphaiwong was allowed to become Prime Minister once 
again. However , his actions were subject to the strict 
surveillance of the military authorities. 
for the time being , thus , the semblance of parlia­
mentary democracy was preserved. On January 29 , 19 48 new 
elections were held. However , few of Pridi' s supporters 
stood for election since they had been dispersed or ar­
rested after the coup. The election gave a resounding
victory to the Democrats. This same pattern also appeared 
in the Northeast; among the 29 out of 34 representatives 
from the Northeast whose party identification I have been 
able to discover , fifteen were Democrats. Of the remaining 
fourteen , four were members of the pro-Pridi , Sahathai
Party , seven were members of Liang Chaiyakan' s nominally 
pro-Pridi Prachachon Party ,a1 6  two were independents , and 
only one was a member of the pro-Phibun Thammaphiphat 
Party . These results indicated that the Northeast , despite
the re-emergence of military power within the central gov­
ernment , remained heavily committed to political leaders 
who supported parliamentary rule. 
Although the Democrats had won a decisive majority , 
Khuang Aphaiwong was not allowed to consolidate his par­
liamentary gains. In April 19 48 the military staged a 
coup de main against Khuang,aand Phibun again returned to 
power. 
The Democrat interlude had merely postponed tempor­
arily the consolidation of power by Phibun. Even before he 
actually assumed power , however , the military and police 
under his control began to move against the major north­
eastern MP' s and ex-cabinet officials who had supported
Pridi. The charges and the ultimate actions taken against
these men were extremely critical in shaping subsequent
political attitudes in the Northeast. Initiallya, Pridi and
all of his followers , including those from the Northeast , 
were charged with having conspired to subordinate Thai 
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national identity within a larger Communist-dominated South­
east Asian union. 
In order to justify the coup , the military 
produced stories of communist and republi­
can plots , or the intended murder of the 
king , and of an armed rebellion that had 
been planned for November 30 ( 19 47 ]. The 
purveyor of the more fantastic stories 
was Luang Kach , who claimed that Pridi had 
been about to establish a Siamese Republic
as a cornerstone for a South East Asia 
Union ; that radio orders had been inter­
cepted and documents found bearing out 
these contentions ; that agents were on 
their way to Switzerland to murder King 
Bhumipon ; and that an arms cache, including 
many Russian weaponse, had been discovered 
at the house of Thong-Indr [Th9ng-In Phuri­
phat , MP from Ubon ] ,  one of Tamrong ' s  
Ministers--arms indubitably intended for 
the communist revolution. (Coast 1953 : 42) 
However , as the possibility of arresting Pridi was thwarted 
by his exile abroade, the charges be-gan to be focusede· more 
specifically on the Northeasterners. The main northeastern 
leaders of Pridi had been in hiding in Thailand , but they 
reappeared in middle and late 1948,  and were almost immedi­
ately arrested. Tiang Sirikhan (Sak9n Nakh9n) , Caml9ng
Daor�ang (Mahasarakham) , Th9ng-In Phuriphat and his brother 
Thim (Ubon) , and Thawin Ud9n (R9i-Et) along with another 
Pridi Minister from the Central Plains, Th9ngplaeo Chonla­
phum (Nakh9n Nayok) were charged with plotting a separatist 
movement in which the Northeast would be joined to Indochina 
in a Communist dominated Southeast Asian Union.e17 
[Tiang Sirikhan] ,  himself a Laotian and a 
person of great prestige in the northeast , 
denied the pro-Communist charge while quite
ope·nly admitting his sympathy with the aim 
of forming some sort of South-East Asian 
Union , though not one that would infringe 
upon Siam ' s  sovereignty. Many Laotians , 
while not wishing to cut themselves loose 
from Siam , felt that the administration of 
the northeast was too feebly controlled 
from Bangkok, and that greater local auton­
omy was essential for proper administration. 
( Coast 1953:50) 
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Phibun's government was spurred to action by an 
attempted counter-couE by Pridi-led forces in February 
1 9 49. In an aftermat to this attempt a number of "Free 
Thai" leaders were found dead of gunshot wounds in their 
homes. In March 1 9 4 9  Th9ng-In, Caml9ng, and Thawin, along
with Th9ngplaeo Chonlaphum, were re-arrested although they 
had just been released a short time before. Shortly after 
their arrest they were shot to death by the police "while 
attempting to escape.e'' 
The official story was that the four men 
were being transferred by bus to another 
prison, when suddenly a resc.uing party
of their friends fired on the bus, killing 
the prisoners and missing the escorting
policemen. ( Coast 1 9 5 3 : 5 3 )  
This incident, known as the "kilo 1 1" incident because the 
four were shot at the road marker north of Bangkok, re­
ceived widespread publicity at that time.e18 In March 
through May, two other northeastern leaders, Thim Phuriphat
and Tiang Sirikhan, were brought to trial on charges of 
separatism.e1 9  However, the outcome of the trial was in­
conclusive, perhaps in consequence of the public outrage 
over the "kilo 11" incident, and both men were released. 
For Tiang Sirikhan, the respite was temporary. He stood in 
a by-election in Sak9n Nakh9n in April 1 9  49, although he 
was under indictment at the time, won his seat back, and 
was again re-elected in 19 52.  In December of 1952,  however, 
Bangkok newspapers reported that he had escaped to Burma to 
evade arrest in conjunction with a new plot by Communist 
conspirators ( Bangkok Post, December 16 and 17, 1 9 5 2 ; 
January 13, 19 5 3 ) .  He never again appeared, and the popu­
lar belief, later corroborated in a court trial, was that 
he too had been assassinated under the direction of Phi­
bun's lieutenant, Police-General Phao. 
The elimination of these men had lasting repercussions 
in the Isan region. Northeasterners had taken pride in the 
accomplishments of local men who had risen to cabinet level. 
This pride was severely injured when these men were killed. 
Moreover they were killed not only because they had been 
followers of Pridi, but, more damaging, because they had 
been Northeasterners. The main charge against Caml9ng, 
Th9ng-In, Thawin, and Tiang was that they were involved in 
a plot to separate the Northeast from the rest of the King­
dom. The Northeast was thus accorded a political identity 
which heretofore it had not had. 
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In the subsequent period these four men became symbols 
of the growing sentiments shared by a large part of the 
northeastern populace that they were discriminated against
as a whole by the Central Thai and the central government.
The death of these prominent northeastern leaders was a 
major catalyst in the development of Isan regional politi­
cal identity and purpose for it demonstrated most dramati­
cally the attitudes of the central government towards those 
who were identified with Isan political aspirations.e· In 
addition, however, Northeasterners also began to feel that 
Central Thai political discrimination was but a symptom of 
more basic economic and cultural discrimination. In the 
next decade these feelings of economic, political and 
cultural discrimination were fired even more as a larger
number of Northeasterners had increased contact with Central 
Thai. 
V. EMERGENCE OF !SAN REGIONALISM 
Although the "kilo 11" incident captured the atten­
tion of the northeastern public in the period just follow­
ing the reappearance of military rule , the impact of the 
postwar expansion of the Thai economy , although less 
dramatic, was beginning to stimulate the development of 
northeastern regionalism in other ways. While Bangkok be­
came a boom town and the Central Plains in general began 
to shift to a commercial economy , the Northeast remained 
tied to a subsisetence economy. Difficulties restricting 
the enlargement of the cash sector of the rural economy
motivated an increasing n11mber of Northeasterners to seek 
temporary work in Bangkok and elsewhere outside the Isan 
region. Out of the inter-related phenomena of economic 
underdevelopment in the Northeast and temporary migration
of Northeasterners to Bangkok grew a more widely held sense 
of Isan regional identity. 
The inability of the northeastern region to respond 
as well as the Central Region to the new economic forces 
which appeared after the war stemmed primarily from the 
poor natural endowment of the region. Soil fertility , 
rainfall patterns , flooding, and population pressures on 
cultivatable land in the Northeast all compare unfavorably 
with the same features in the Central Region. For example, 
production figures for paddy show that whereas the average
yield in the Central Plains was 2 2 7  kilograms per rail in 
19S0-Sl ,  the comparable figure for the Northeast was 1�5 
kilograms per rai for the same years ( Thailand , Ministry of 
Agriculture 1 9 61 : 39 ) . e2 However , such a comparison signi­
fied little to the average northeastern peasant so long as 
the country as a whole was geared primarily to subsistence 
agriculture and so long as he produced sufficient quanti­
ties of rice for the needs of his family. 
In the immediate postwar period commercial rice pro­
duction in the Central Plains expanded rapidly in order to 
meet the demands of neighboring countries whose economies 
had been severely damaged by the war and by subsequent 
revolutionse. In contrast little surplus rice could be 
produced in the Northeast and what was produced was not 
easily saleable since it was of the glutinous or "sticky" 
variety , the staple of the region , rather than white rice. 
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Poor resources and inadequate transportation connections 
inhibited entrance of many northeastern farmers into other 
forms of commercial farm production.e3 By the early 19 5 0's 
a marked discrepancy in cash income between the Northeast 
and the Central Plains was apparent not only to the outside 
observer but also to the Northeasterners themselves. In 
1 9 5 e3, for example, average annual cash income per farm 
family in the Northeast was only 9 5 4 baht4 as compared with 
2 , 8 8 8  baht in the Central Plains. Moreover, the cash income 
of the northeastern farm family was less than th-at of farm 
families in any other part of Thailand ( Thailand, Ministry 
of Agriculture 1955 : 2 6 ) .  
While the Northeast remained relatively untouched by
the new economic expansion, Bangkok was developing rapidly. 
In previous periods of expansion in Bangkok immigrant 
Chinese had comprised most of the unskilled labor force and 
as one group of immigrants rose in status, a new group of 
immigrants arrived to take the positions at the lowest 
socio-economic rung of the urban ladder. However, after 
19 4 9 mass  immigration of Chinese into Thailand ended 
following the imposition of quotas of 2 0 0  immigrants from 
any one country per year ( Skinner 195 7 : 117-8 ) .  The demands 
of a rapidly expanding Bangkok coming at a time when a 
maj or s ource of labor was shut off created a vacuum in the 
urban labor force. This vacuum was filled by the in-migra­
tion of people indigenous to Thailand into Bangkok at a 
minimum rate of 3 7, 8 0 0  persons annually between 19 4 7 and 
5195e4.e
Among those who poured into Bangkok were large numbers 
of northeastern peasants in quest of wage-labor in order to 
supplement the subsistence endeavors of their families ( cf. 
Textor 1961 : 15-16 ) .  Although Northeasterners were by no 
means the only immigrants to Bangkok, the place of the Isan 
peasants in the Thai capital was unique. For one thing,
most of the migration of Isan villagers to Bangkok was ( and 
i·s )  "temporary. " That is, migrants come to Bangkok only 
seasonally, between harvest and planting times, or, at most,
spend only a few years in Bangkok before returning to settle 
permanently in their home villages ( Textor 196 1 : 11 ;  Keyes
1966a :e3 12 et passim) . Secondly, most rural migrants are 
young, unattached (or Semporarily separated) males between 
the ages of 2 0  and 2 9 .  Finally, most of the peasant mi­
grants enter the unskilled labor force as pedicab drivers 
( until a ban on pedicabs was promulgated in 1 9 6 0 ) ,  construc­
tion workers, or workers in various Chinese-operated mills 
and factories. 
How many northeastern villagers have participated in 
this practice of temporary migration to Bangkok is unknown. 
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However, enough evidence exists to suggest that a sizeable 
percentage of the men from all parts· of the region who came 
of age in the postwar period have been involved. In the 
village of Ban N9ng Tv.n in Mahasarakham, in which I carried 
out field work, for example, 49 per cent of the men twenty
years of age and over or 67  per cent of the men between 30 
and 39 had worked in Bangkok (only one woman had ever worked 
in the Thai capital).e7 
In Bangkok the northeastern migrants found themselves 
considered inferior by urban Thai. Not only were they
employed in lowly occupations, but they also discovered that 
Ba�gkok Thai thought of them as unsophisticated and uncul­
tured provincials (cf. Textor 19 61: 17, 2 4-5) .  Faced with 
such attitudes Northeasterners tended to congregate in Bang­
kok, "drawn • • •  by a common sub-culture, dialect, taste for 
food and music, etc.e" (Textor 1961:22). In Bangkok the 
northeastern sector of the labor force emerged as a rela­
tively distinctive lower-class whose organization and 
desires were utilized to advantage by Isan MP's. 
There is, in fact, considerable evidence 
that a Thai lower class is emerging [in 
Bangkok] with common interests and some 
class consciousness. Low in possession
of niost values important in a·angkok
society, the class is primarily concerned 
with basic well-being, i.e. , the health 
and safety of the organism. Some ele-
ments within the class, pedicab drivers, 
for instance, are formally organized for 
the attainment of group interests, while 
others--domestic servants and market 
gardeners for example--are informally 
organized. The class has been wooed by 
some Thai politicians in hopes of support
at the polls. The fact that a large pro­
portion of this class consists of recent 
immigrants from up-country, especially 
Northeast Siam, provides a natural basis 
for some working arrangement with Assembly­
men representing the [provinces] in question. 
(Skinner 19 5 7 : 309) 
Textor has suggested that the northeastern pedicab drivers, 
one of the most important groups among the Isan migrants in 
Bangkok, were more politically aware· than non-northeastern 
laborers: 
The great majority of [northeastern] 
drivers have cast ballots for members of 
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Parliament in their native province;
perhaps well over half of the drivers 
can accurately supply the name of one 
or more of their home province ' s  repre­
sentatives in Parliament • • • •  The degree 
of interest in parliamentary poli ti·cs 
is probably greater than that found 
among other working people, in Bangkok 
or elsewhere in Thailand. (Textor 1961:44) 
From his experiences in Bangkok the returned migrant 
carried home with him feelings of class and ethnic discrimi­
nation directed towards him as a Northeasterner by Central 
Thai inhabitants of Bangkok and an enhanced awareness  of the 
common culture and problems which all Northeasterners share. 
In brief, the pattern of increasing temporary migration of 
northeastern villagers to Bangkok beginning in the postwar 
period greatly spurred the development of "we-they" atti­
tudes among Northeasterners. Moreover, the "we" was begin­
ning to assume a more regional character. 
. During Phibun ' s  second period in power between 194 7  
and 195 7, many representatives from the Isan area played upon 
a growing sense of regionalism to put pressure on the central 
government to direct more attention. towards the Northeast. 
The objective which these MP's promoted on behalf of their 
regional constituency was the reduction or elimination of 
alleged discrimination of the national government towards the 
Northeast. These representatives claimed that there was 
ample evidence that the central government ignored, and even 
suppressed (e. g. , the "kilo 11" incident and the disappear­
ance of Tiang Sirikhan) Isan political leadership and over.­
emphasized bureaucratic centraliazation to the detriment of 
the northeastern region. They also claimed that the 
government was not doing enough to stimulate development in 
the Northeast so that the region could attain the same
economic level as the rest of the country. Finally, they 
maintained that the central government, and the Central Thai 
in general, treated Northeasterners as cultural or class 
inferiors. If ever the Isan MP's in Bangkok needed to 
"prove" their points, they could call public meetings of the 
Northeasterners working in the city who were very responsive 
to "exposing" the discrimination of the central government 
towards the Isan people.aa 
In the parliamentary debates of the first years after 
Phibun ' s  return to power a number of northeastern MPa's 
continually raised the charge of economic discrimination of
the government against the Northeast. In July 1949, for 
example, Bunpheng Phrommankhun, a Prachachon deputy from Sis­
aket, attacked the government for its economic neglect of the 
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Northeast. In the same month several Isan MP's raised an 
issue which had found its way into earlier debates -
namely, government discrimination against northeastern rice 
millers in the international marketing of rice.e9 In Decem­
ber 195 0 Liang Chaiyakan (Ubon) organized a rally of North­
easterners in Bangkok at which he planned to announce gov­
ernment appropriations for irrigation works in northeastern 
provinces. However, several other northeastern representa­
tives, including Lieutenant Charubut R�angsuwan (Independent, 
Kh9nkaen), and Bunkhum Chamsisuriyawong (Independent, Ud9n),
took the opportunity of the rally to protest publicly how 
little the government really was doing for the Northeast. 
Although the theme of economic discrimination began
to be important at this time, feelings of political discri­
mination also continued to run high.· In the parliamentary 
debate on a new constitution in January 1949 several north­
eastern MP's spoke out strongly against the constitution,
and one group, led by Ch�n Rawiwan ( Sahathai, N9ngkhai) at­
tacked the "indivisibility of the kingdom" clause on the 
grounds that it was potentially injurious to the rights of 
Northeasterners. In December 1949 six MP's ( including four 
from the Northeast) rather quixotically proposed that Thai­
land be divided into six autonomous regions.10 Opposition 
of northeast�rn MP's to the military government appeared
again in November 1950 when a large n11mber of northeastern 
MP's ( including all of the Democrats and several followers 
of Pridi) supported a Democrat-sponsored petition for a 
general parliamentary debate on government policy. In 
December 1950 at the rally of Northeasterners in Bangkok, 
Nat Ngoenthap ( Independent, Mahasarakham) delivered a 
speech in which he stated that although the three north­
eastern MP's who had been killed in the "kilo 11" incident 
were gone, he and others would continue to fight for the 
cause of the Northeast as they had done ( Thompson and 
Adloff 1945-50). 
The public positions of the Isan MP's together with 
the majority of opposition Democrats in the Parliament were 
an embarrassment to Phibun. It is somewhat surprising that 
he did not eliminate the Parliament altogether, particularly 
after attempted coups in 1949 and 1951 proved that opposi­
tion to him was not without its strength. However, his con­
trol of the country through the military must have appeared 
sufficiently sure to convince him that he could permit the 
window dressing of parliamentary rule. 
However, he did call new elections in Feburary 1952 
with the expressed hope that they would provide him with a 
popular mandate. Nationally, the results were favorable 
for Phibun, for the pro-government Farm Labor (Kasikammak9n) 
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Party led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs won approxi­
mately 50 of the 12 3  seats. To these were added the 2 7  
seats of the Prachachon Party, taken into the Phibun camp 
by its leader, Liang Chaiyakan (Bangkok Post, May 6, 1952). 
comparison of the 1952 election results (The Siam 
Directory 1955 : 4-6) with past .and subsequent elections 
suggests that those elected in 1952 might be grouped as 
followsa: 
Pro-Phibun 11 
Pro-Pridi or Leftist 11
Democrat 3
Independent 7
Unknown 10 
It would appear that the Northeast electorate was still re­
luctant to give a military-led government a majority even at 
a time when the military was firmly ensconced in power and 
had won a parliamentary majority in the rest of the Kingdom.
Moreover, the leadership of the non-Democrat opposition of 
the new parliament seemed to have come from the North­
eastern MP's. Most influential, until his "disappearance" 
later in 1952, was Tiang Sirikhan from Sak9n Nakh9n. In 
addition, ·Thep Chotinuchit from Sisaket, who was to become a 
major figure in the "new left" revfya1 of 1955-58, emerged 
as an important opposition leader. The strength of the 
Isan-led opposition was apparent in the 35 votes, out of 241 
cast by MP'as of both appointed and elected categories, which
Thep received in the election for the president of the 
Assembly (Bangkok Post, March 21, 1952).a12 
Although political parties were banned shortly after 
the opening of the Assembly, an opposition continued to
flourish under the leadership of Thep and another northeastern 
deputy, Klaeo Noraphat of Kh9nkaen (Darling 19 65 : 124-126). 
In addition to the regional objectives which the northeastern 
component of this opposition advocated during the next three 
years, it also pressed continually for a loosening of the 
military'as grip on the government. Further, it began to 
advocate a neutralist foreign policy in contrast to the pro­
American policy of the Phibun government. Mainly in reaction 
to the neutralist position of the opposition, the government 
accused its leadership of subverting national interests 
(Bangkok Post, January 23, 195 4 ;  Darling 1965 : 124-126). 
General Phao, Phibun'as head of the police, was more specific.
He accused Thep and his followers of being connected with 
the Viet Minh (Bangkok Post, January 2 3, 195 4). Such accu­
sations attest to the fact that the belief was yet alive 
among some members of the ruling elite that the opposition 
leaders from the Isan region were allied with the Viet 
Minh,
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Pathet Lao, and Red Chinese leadership in a Communist 
conspiracye. 
Haunted, perhaps, by the ghosts of the earlier north­
eastern leaders who had been eliminated because of similar 
fears, Phibun held in check those members of his government 
•
who would have liked to remove the more vocal of the present 
opposition leadership from the Isan region. Moreover, in 
1955 Phibun decided to lead the country once again on the 
road to the development of "democracy.e" He legali�ed the 
establishment of political parties and decreed that an elec­
tion would be held shortly for a new parliament. Three 
recognizable political groupings then began to emerge: the 
pro-government Seri Manangkhasila and associated parties led 
by Phibun himself ; the old Democrat Party led by Khuang 
Aphaiwong ; and a group of small parties which represented 
various shadings of what Wilson has called Thailand's ".new 
left" ( Wilson 1959 ) .  The two most important of these 
"leftist" parties, the Economist ( Setthak9n) and the Free 
Democratic ( Seri Prachathipatai) were founded by MP's from 
the Northeast. 
The leader of the pro-government Seri Manangkhasila 
Party in the Northeast was Liang Chaiyakan ( Ubon) who had 
spent more time in the Assembly than any other Northeasterner 
and had moved through all political groupings ( Democrat, 
pro-Pridi, and pro-Phibun) at various points in his career. 
Almost as long-tenured, but politically more consistent, 
was the northeastern head of the Democrat Party, Nai Fqng 
Sitthitham, also from Ubon. The leaders of the Economist 
Party, Thep Chotinuchit ( Sisaket) and Thim Phuriphat ( Ubon) 
had stirred considerable interest and received much pub­
licity for making a trip to Communist China in 1956 without 
government sanction. On their return they had been arrested, 
but were released shortly thereafter. However, although 
this act had made them well-known in Bangkok circles, both 
Thep and Thim gave more emphasis to internal economic 
problems than to foreign policy in their attempt to win 
support for the Economist Party. The Free Democratic Party,
the other major leftist party, was founded by Saing Marangkun 
from Buriram. A somewhat more colorful ( and more doctrinaire)
leftist party which, however, was more restricted in appeal, 
was the Hyde Park Movement led by Thawisak Triphli from 
Kh9nkaen. 
There were minor leftist parties and some limited 
support for the northeastern-led leftist groups outside 
the Isan region, but for the most part the whole leftist 
movement was predominantly a northeastern product. For 
example, the Free Democratic Party put up 45 candidates in 
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the February 1957 elections, of which 29 were from the 
Northeast (Bangkok Post, January 7, 1957). However, of the 
eleven seats this party captured, all were from the North­
east. As can be seen from Table I, this pattern was repeated
for other leftist parties. 
Following the February election the government was
accused of rigging election results, students demonstrated 
against Phibun, Sari t Thanarat., the head of the army, disas­
sociated himself from the government, and the position of 
Phibun and his lieutenant, Police-General Phao, deteriorated. 
In September General Sarit Thanarat led a military coup 
d'etat which forced Phibun and Phao into exile. However,
Sarit himself did not assume immediate control of the govern­
ment. Ill health forced him to leave the country and to
seek medical treatment in the United States and England. 
From September 1957 until October 1958, two of Sarit' s asso­
ciates, Phot Sarasin (September 1957-January 1958) and 
Than9m Kitthikach9n (January-October 1958), served as Prime 
Ministers. During this period considerable political freedom 
existed in the country. 
In December 1957  the kingdom was given the opportunity 
to express itself once again at the polls, as the caretaker 
government claimed it was necessary- to provide "clean" 
elections to offset alleged misconduct by Phibun and his 
cohorts. The December elections indicated, on the surface 
at least, not only a markeda.decline in electoral support for 
followers of Phibun (as might be expected), but also a reduc­
tion in the number of leftist MP's (see Table II). However,
contrary to the interpretations of some observers (Wilson
1959:98; Darling 19 65:a183) that the December elections repre­
sented a major drop in the popular appeal of the leftists,
in fact, in the Northeast where such sentiments were to be 
found, the new election really did not reveal such a shift. 
For one thing, three candidates elected as leftists in 
February, including Thim Phuriphat (Ubon), were elected in 
December on the pro-Sarit Sahaphum ticket. In addition, at
least four other Sahaphwn deputies elected from the Northeast 
(Kiat Nakkhaphong, Mahasarakham; Prathip Sirikhan, Sak9n
Nakh9n; Khr9ng Chandawong, Sak9n Nakh9n; and Ora-in Phuriphat,
Ubon) also espoused political objectives similar to those of 
the leftists. This affiliation of leftist-leaning repre­
sentatives with the Sahaphum or pro-Sarit party reflected the 
belief held in some circles at the time of the election that 
the Sahaphum party had Socialist inclinations. To these 
"disguised leftists" must be added at least three "Independent" 
MP'as (Chl,ln Rawiwan, N9ngkhai; Pll,lang Wansi, Surin; and Suthi 
Phuwaphan Surin) who ran on much the same platform as the
leftists. 1a3 In short, thus, northeastern support for candi­
dates designated loosely as leftist remained relatively 
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TABLE I: RESULTS OF FEBRUARY 1957 ELECTION FOR 
WHOLE K INGDOM AND NORTHEASTERN REGION* 
Party Affiliation No. Seats ·No. Seats 
Nationally Northeast 
I .  PRO-PHI BUN 
Seri Managkhasila 85 15 
Thammathiphat 10 2 
Total Pro-Phibun 17 
I I .  DEMOCRAT 28 10 
III. LEFTIST 
Economist ( Setthak9n) 8 
Free Democratic ( Seri 
Prachathipatai) 11 11 
Hyde Park Movement 2 1 
Total Leftist 21 20 
IV .  OTHER 
Nationalist 3 0 
v .  INDEPENDENT 13 6 
TOTAL 160 5 3  
* SOURCES: The Siam Directory ( 1957 : 1-6) and Darling 
( 19 6 5 : 1 5 7 ) . 
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TABLE I I: RESULTS OF DECEMBER 19 5 7  ELECTIONS FOR 
WHOLE KINGDOM AND NORTHEASTERN REGION*  
Party Affiliation No. Seats No. Seats 
Nationally Northeast 
I. PRO-PHI BUN 
Seri Manangkhasila 4 0 
I I. PRO-SARIT 
Sahaphum 2 0  
I I I. DEMOCRAT 39 3 
IV. LEFTIST 
Economist (Setthak9n) 6 5 
Free Democratic (Seri Prachathipatai) 5 5 
Hyde Park Movement 1 1 
Total Leftist 12 11 
v .  OTHER 
Nationalist 1 0 
Issara 1 1 
Total Other 2 1 
VI . INDEPENDENT 5 8  18  
TOTAL 160 5 3  
• 
* SOURCES: Bangkok Post, December 17 , 1 8 ,  19 , 19 5 7  and 
Thailand, Institute of Public Administration, 
Thammasat University ( 19 5 8 : 45-51)  . 
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strong in the December elections. Furthermore , in both the 
1957 elections , leftist appeal was almost exclusively re­
stricted to the Isan region and in that region at least 
one-third of the elected representatives could be said to 
espouse the rather diffuse ideals of the "new left." 
What explained the popularity of the leftist candi­
dates in the Northeast as contrasted with the rest of the 
country? The day before the February 195 7 election the 
Bangkok Post published the following evaluation: 
Political circles noted that it is a 
peculiarity of the northeast to prefer
any opposition candidate to a government 
one , and opposition candidates have stressed 
in publicity posters that they are in oppo­
sition. 
The observers also noted that the Seri 
Manangkhasila Party candidates in the north­
east are further handicapped through non­
cooperation and through actual dissension • • • 
The Sethakorn (Economist) Party is re­
portedly leading in many of the northeastern 
provinces. The party leader , Nai Thep 
Jotincuchit , is considered at present , 
the most popular candidate in [Sisaket] 
while the deputy leader , Nai Tim Buripat , 
is one of the most popular in [Ubon]. 
Both went to Communist China last year and 
were arrested on their return , and both had 
stirred up some interest regarding trade 
with Communist China.
However , according to [Sisaket ] Governor 
Kitthi Yothakari and [Ubon ] Governor 
Prasong Issarabhakdi , the people of these 
provinces are not much interested in inter­
national politics , being more concerned with 
their own living conditions and their own 
means of livelihood. 
Nai Prasong reported that ' Poujadists' 
have appeared on the scene in [Ubon].  He 
said that some opposition candidates are 
promising the people that if they are
elected to the government , they would 
abolish taxes. (Bangkok Post , February 
2 5 ,  1957) 
The governors were undoubtedly correct in their as­
sessment that the international concerns of the leftist 
politicians probably had very little appeal for the rela­
tively unsophisticated northeastern peasantry. But 
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pointing to the villagers' preoccupation with their own 
means of livelihood does not lead us much further in under­
standing why leftist candidates emerged and succeeded pri­
marily in the Northeast. I would suggest that leftist 
candidates were generally more successful than many other
Isan candidates in exploiting the regional sentiments which 
had reached a peak in the Northeast in 195 7. 
In some ways the "leftist" parties could be equated 
with "regional" parties. Whereas the leftist candidates 
traced their ideological heritage to the "martyred" north­
eastern leaders and were associated with a leadership which 
was almost exclusively from the northeastern region, the 
non-leftists were much more tied to political leaders who 
were Central Thai. Wilson has questioned whether the 
"leftist" identification of some northeastern candidates 
was not secondary to a more basic regional oppositionism: 
Political figures from the northeast seem 
to stand or fall on the vigor [with]a
.a
which 
they oppose the government. Such opposi­
tion has often taken the form of more or 
less radical ''aleftist'' ideology, although 
it has as often been pure oppositionism. 
The consistent ingredient .has always been 
opposition, and it may be assumed that 
such an attitude is necessary for success 
in politics in the northeast. This situa­
tion has earned the region a reputation fora· 
breeding radical politicians. Whether or
not such a reputation is deserved is diffi­
cult to say . (Wilson 1959:81) 
Wilson's analysis notwithstanding, it does appear that 
the radical solutions to the economic problems of the North­
east proposed by many of the leftist candidates also fell on 
sympathetic ears. Returned migrants who had seen the con­
trast between the standard of living in Bangkok and in their 
home villages and who had developed new expectations would 
have been especially receptive to promises of candidates to 
work for the raising of economic standards in the Isan 
countryside. However, the ability to play upon an emerging
regionalism was not associated exclusively with the leftists. 
Many non-leftist candidates who had already attained some 
prominence in Bangkok were p�eferred by the northeaste:n 
electorate over leftist candidates who, however appealing 
their campaign promises might have been, were relatively
unknown. Even so important an apologist for the Phibun gov­
ernment as Liang Chaiyakan (Ubon) was re-elected by a large 
majority in both the February and December 1957 elections.a1 4 
It should be noted that although a member of Phibuna' s  party 
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(and at one time a member of Phibun' s government) , Liang 
•
had been a major advocate of government action for economic 
improvement of the Northeast. 
The Northeastern populace returned representatives 
whom they believed would best represent their interests in 
the national forum. Often the elected MP's were "leftists"
who promised to further the regional interests of Isan. 
But just as often the chosen deputy was seen by the elec­
torate as a man who had some influence in ruling circles 
in Bangkok and could, thus, act as an advocate for his 
northeastern constituency. It is significant that 66 per 
cent of the northeastern representatives elected in December
195 7 �ad b1g
n elected in either the 1952 or February 195 7  
elections. 
During 1958, although the northeastern MP's of the 
various parties differed in their views on such non-regional 
matters as attitudes towards Pridi, the Anti-Communist Act,
neutralist versus pro-Western foreign policy, or relations 
with Communist China, there seemed to be consensus among
all in seeking "cooperation to bring about improvements of 
conditions in the northeast" (Bangkok Post, February 27, 
1958) .  In April 195 8  all of the northeastern MP's who were 
in the pro-government party presented an "ultimatum" to 
the governmerit. The deputies presented a set of four de­
mands which they asked to be acted upon within fifteen days
or else they would leave the party and form a separate 
Northeast Party, presumably together with leftist Isan rep­
resentatives who had been making overtures to all north­
eastern MP's about the possibility of forming an Isan 
Party. The demands were as follows: 
1. An urgent short-term project for 
improving conditions in the north­
east should be started in order to 
relieve suffering and hunger there 
as soon as possible.
2. The Government should also draw up 
a longer term project "like the Yan­
hee Hydro Electric Project, through 
foreign loans as in the central and 
southern projects.'' 
3. The Government should establish heavy 
industries in the northeast ''which 
has plenty of raw materials." 
4. The Government should increase educa­
tional facilities in the northeast. 
(Bangkok Post, April 11, 1958) 
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The report did not mention how the northeastern deputies
thought that these proposals could be met within 15 days, 
and subsequent reports indicated that no representative
resigned from the party. However, the idea of forming a 
Northeastern Party which would advocate immediate and 
radical solutions to the economic problems of the Isan 
region remained. In May twenty-one northeastern MP ' s  from 
12 out of the 15 Isan provinces and representing leftist,
pro-government, and independent parties, held a meeting in 
which it was "approved in principle ••• that ' only through
socialism can conditions in fge northeast be improved'a" 
(Bangkok Post, May 2, 19S8). 
The growing regional loyalties of a majority of the 
representatives from the Isan region caused concern among
the leadership of the Thai government. But far more worri­
some to the government were the attitudes adopted by the 
leftist MP' s from the Northeast on international issues. 
The leftist parties were opposed to Thailand' s membership
in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Asian 
people's Anti-Communist League, to the receiving of 
American aid which they alleged had "strings" attached, 
and to a pro-Western foreign policy. Officials in the 
government close to General Sarit viewed the pressures, 
exerted primarily by northeastern representatives, for 
''asocialistic" programs to improve the economic position of 
the Northeast, for greater toleration of leftist political 
action within the country, and for a neutral foreign policy 
with grave apprehension. They were beginning to feel that 
if given free reign the activities of the northeastern MP'as 
could seriously threaten the security of Thailand. There 
was a growing awareness among these government leaders of 
the need to deal with what they considered a "northeastern 
problem." 
After Sarit inaugurated a new period of military rule 
in late 1958 this ''aproblem'' and its ''solutions' were to
become a major preoccupation of the Thai government. 
VI • THE "NORTHEAST PROB LEM" AND THAILAND' S 
QUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
The heady political atmosphere which obtained in 
Thailand between September 195 7  and October 1958 ,  reminis­
cent in many ways of the 195 6-7 period , was made possible
by the government'as lack of clarity as to the political 
direction it would take. Although few leading members of 
the government , such as Than9m Kitthikach9n and Police­
General Praphat Charusatian , were in sympathy with those 
who desired to see Thailand move towards the left , Sarit' s 
absence abroad made them cautious about moving against what 
they must have felt was a growing popular movement. To 
some extent the Than9m government even attempted to accom­
modate the interests of the "new left . "  Thim Phuriphat 
(Ubon) , for example , who had been a major leftist leader 
before the December 195 7 elections was included in the 
cabinet. In June 1958 Than9m felt it necessary to publicly 
state that t�e government was working for "mild socialisma" 
(Bangkok Post , June 18 , 1958). But such accommodation did 
not extend to opening the political scene to all comers, 
for the National Socialist (the pro-government party) MP'as 
voted in June , 40 to 11,  to k
1
ep the Anti-Communist Act 
(Bangkok Post , June 4 ,  1958). 
By mid-195 8  the government' s position was becoming
shaky as it ran into serious economic troubles. The oppo­
sition , including both Democrats and leftists , began to
call for a "General Debate. "  In addition the government 
party was faced with insuborqination of some of its own
members who maee or planned trips , a½ong with opposition
MP'as ,  to Russia and Communist Chinaa. Such was the state 
of affairs when Sarit suddenly reappeared on the scenea. 
He only stayed in Bangkok for a short time , but his senti­
ments soon became known and felt. The two major Isan 
representatives in the cabinet , Thim Phuriphat and Ari Tan­
wetchakun (Khorat) , were forced to resign because of their 
occasional outspoken opposition to some government policies. 
Sarit openly voiced his disapproval of National Socialist 
members who had gone on visits to Russia or China , and he 
asked that the name of the party no longer be translated 
in English as "National Socialist" because it was not 
socialistic. Then he left for more treatment in England. 
In October 1958 he suddenly appeared again , and on the 
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21st the Revolutionary Group, under his direction, took 
over the government and declared martial law. In the after­
math of this coM� many leftwing northeastern MP'as as well as pro-government ' s  who had travelled to Russia or China 
were arrested or went into exile.a3 It is noteworthy that 
at least two Isan deputies who went into exile, Thim Phuri­
phat (Ubon, National Socialist) and Saing Marangkun (Buriram,
Free Democrat), were reported to have found asylum in Pathet 
Lao territory. 
Sarit'as cdup spelled the return of military dictator­ship to Thailana. In fact, with the exception of the brief 
periods 19 4 4-47 and 1957-58, the control of the military has 
been a sine qua non for holding the reins of the Thai govern­
ment since at least 19 38. With the shift back to a military 
dictatorship the National Assembly was no longer an outlet 
for expressions of Isan regionalism since it no longer
existed. The army has itself absorbed many upwardly mobile 
Northeasterners, although information on the number is un­
available. 4 The most notable example of an ex-Northeasterner 
who did well in the army is Sarit himself. Sarit, however, 
can only be counted as half-Isan. Although his father was a 
district officer in Nakh9n Phanom province and his step­
brother, Sanguan Chanthasakha, was an MP (1957-58) from, 
and later .governor of, Nakh9n Phanom, Sarit had all of his 
education in Bangkok and for the most part was Bangkok­
oriented. In a sense Sarit' s case is typical of ex-North­
easterners who enter the army for, in contrast to the National 
Assembly, the military at the officer level makes Thai out 
of those who were not Thai originally. Sarit did occasionally 
recall his regional past in order to generate some popular
support for his government, but Sarit aside, no other high­
ranking officers, if they exist, have been conspicuous in 
emphasizing their Isan ties. 
During Sarit's premiership, terminated by his death 
in December 19 63, the "northeastern problem" was redefined
in Thai ruling circles from having been one of minor pro­
vincial complaints to one of potential danger to the con­
tinued existence of the government and of Thailand itself. 
This shift in definition was closely related to growing 
official fears concerning the renewed civil war in Vietnam 
and Laos. The government felt that the Northeast had several 
characteristics which might make it the Achilles heel in 
'I'hailand I s attempt to maintain its own security if Communism 
were to succeed in South Vietnam and Laos. The Thai leader­
ship began to fear that economic underdevelopment in the 
northeastern region might make it fertile ground in which 
seeds of insurrection could grow. Moreover, Isan regionalism 
might develop into an open Isan separatist movement which 
would look to North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Pathet 
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Lao for support. Finally, the government felt that there 
was sufficient evidence to suggest that some of the north­
eastern political leadership was already involved in a 
Communist conspiracy to overthrow the pro-Western govern­
ment of Thailand. 
From the 1954  Geneva Conference onwards Thailand has 
been fearful that the power obtained by the Viet Minh in 
North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao or Neo Lao Hak Sat Party
in Laos might be difficult to contain. The Pathet Lao had 
been included in the new government of Laos in 19 5 4 ,  but 
in 19 5 8  they were excluded when Phoui Sannikhone replaced
Souvanna Phoumma as Prime Minister. The shift to the 
right in the Lao government was viewed with great pleasure 
by Sarit. However, on August 5, 1960 Colonel (later 
General) Kong Le staged a coup d'�tat in Vientiane and called 
upon Souvanna Phoumma to return to head a government of 
neutrality. In December 1960 Lao rightist forces attacked 
Vientiane and put the neutralists to rout. The neutralists 
then joined with the Pathet Lao forces on the Plain of Jars. 
From this point on the combined Pathet Lao-ne·utralist forces 
began to advance at the expense of the rightists. Although
a cease-fire was negotiated in May of 1961, the Pathet Lao 
did not stop their advance. This advance was viewed with 
grave concern in both Bangkok and Washington. The fall of 
Nam Tha in Northern Laos in May of 19 6.2 almost brought Thai 
and/or American troops into action. 
While the Pathet Lao-neutralist forces advanced 
militarily, representatives of the three factions and mem­
bers of the Geneva conference were meeting in an attempt to 
forge some sort of agreement. Finally in July 1962 a 
Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos was 
signed by all parties in Geneva. This declaration and the 
concomitant agreement of the three Laotian factions led to 
the formation of a "troika" government including Souvanna 
Phoumma as Prime Minister, Prince Souphannuwong of the 
Pathet Lao and General Phoumi Nosavan, the right-wing 
leader, as deputy Prime Ministers. 
The period from the fall of the rightist government
in August 19 6 0  to the emergence of the troika government
in July of 1962 was one in which Bangkok seriously con­
sidered moving into Laos, either under the SEATO banner 
or on their own, in order to keep Laos as a buffer state 
between itself and North Vietnam. Thailand was a reluctant 
signer of the Geneva Declaration and Protocol regarding
Laos and viewed with grave misgivings the inclusion of both 
neutralists and Communists in the new government. It was 
felt that given but a few months, the whole of Laos would 
be under Communist control. As Sarit said: 
53 
As for Laos being neutral, it would be 
fine if it were true. But a country that 
is able to be neutral must be a country
that is not weak. It must be economically 
strong and capable of helping itself as 
Switzerland is. As for Laos, it cannot 
stand on its own feet. (S·a:p·hada San,
Bangkok, October l, 1960 ; English trans­
lation from Wilson 1961 : 15) 
The growing crisis in Southeast Asia was compounded by 
increased Viet Cong pressure in South Vietnam beginning in 
the later part of 1960. From 1961 until Diem's death in 
November 1963 the Viet Cong was able to capitalize on the 
growing resentment towards the Diem regime which existed in 
manye·sectors of the populace and on the attendant deteriora­
tion of governmental authority in the Vietnamese countryside. 
As the Viet Cong received their supplies primarily frome. North 
Vietnam, both they and the North Vietnamese became even more 
eager to have the Pathet Lao control eastern Laos in order 
to safeguard their paths of communication (the so-called Ho 
Chi Minh trail) which passed along the Annamite mountains 
dividing Laos and Vietnam. The stakes in Laos thus increased 
in direct relation to the increase of the conflict in South 
Vietnam. 
Political opposition which persisted in the Thai North­
east was seen by the Thai government in the context of the 
growing crises in Vietnam and Laos. It was believed that 
the success of the Viet Cong and/or Pathet Lao would bring
hostile and expansionistic governments to power near the 
borders of Thailand. If some of the regional opposition in 
the Isan region was sympathetic to or controlled by these 
powers, then Thailand itself would be threatened by internal 
insurrection or external attack supported by a "fifth column" 
in the exposed Northeast. All northeastern political
dissent, since it was not permitted to be channeled within
legitimate forums, was viewed by the Thai government as part
of a larger Communist-led conspiracy to overthrow the pro­
western government of Thailand. Consequently, such dissent 
must, in the government ' s belief, be ferreted out and elimi­
nated.es 
In 1961 the government twice made raids which resulted 
in numerous arrests of alleged Communist agents and supporters 
in several northeastern towns. The biggest of these raids 
occurred in December of 1961 when over a hundred suspects 
were arrested in Sak9n Nakh9n and Ud9n. The government 
claimed that those arrested "are recruiters of villagers to 
the cause of Communist separationists who want to effect 
secession of the Northeast from the rest of the Kingdom" 
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(Bangkok Post, December 15, 1961). The government also 
claimed that these arrests were a follow-up to the arrest 
of a former pro-government MP from Sak9n Nakh9n, Khr9ng 
Chanthawong, who had earlier been executed as a Communist 
ringleader. Also in the December raid the police engaged
in the first "battle" between government forces and indi­
genous "Communists" in Nakh9n Phanom province. Although
stressing that those captured were themselves Northeast­
erners, the government alleged that the suspects had been 
trained by and were under orders from the Pathet Lao. 
Fears of a tie-in between a suspected northeastern "libera­
tiod'amovement and the Pathet Lao were suggested by the 
formation of a "Thai Exiles Group" comprising some former 
MP'as from the Northeast in Xieng Khouang, Laos. This group 
was plotting, so one reporter claimed, "to carve the North­
east out of Thailand and join it to Laos" (Theh Chongkhadi­
kij, Bangkok Post, March s, 1962). 6 
The Thai government under Thanom Kitthikach9n, who 
became Prime Minister after Sarit'as death in December 1963,
has continued to suppress Isan political dissent. Although
Thanom has promised a new constitution, a new act which 
would permit political parties once again, and a new elec­
tion since 196 4, the country remains under military rule. 
The government feels that the increasing number of 
"incidents" in the Northeast, the creation of an organiza­
tion called alternatively the Thailand Independence Movement 
or the Thailand Patriotic Front (cf. Close 1965) and formed 
with the support of Peking and Hanoia7 and the continued 
gravity of the war in Vietnam preclude any liberalization 
of the political system. Instead, the governments of both 
Sarit and Thanom have offered as solutionsa- to the "north­
eastern problem" military or police responses to appearance 
of organized political opposition in the region, accelerated 
programs in economic development, and intensified "Thai­
ification'' of the Isan populace. 
The Thai government has increased the number of troops 
it has in the Northeast and has attempted to strengthen its 
police forces in order to handle any "insurrectionist" 
activity which might occur. At the same time the build-up 
of Thai forces in the Northeast is also seen as a protection
against a potential extE\l"nal military threat emanating from 
or through Laos. Concomitant with the Thai build-up has 
been the opening of several American air bases at Khorat , 
Ud9n, Ubon, and Nakh9n Phanom (see Map II). Theoretically 
these bases exist as part of a joint Thai-U. S .  defense 
effort, but in fact many of the air mis sions flown over
North Vietnam and Laos originate from them. These bases 
have raised the stakes in the Northeast for Thailand is 
open to the charge that it is actively invoalved in the war 
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effort against the Viet Cong and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. In consequence, the North Vietnamese and the Pathet 
Lao would like to stimulate, if they have not already done 
so, the increase of "insurrectionist" activity in the North­
east in order to threaten the security of the bases and to 
cause Thailand to back away from its support of the Viet­· 
namese war. As Peter Braestrup has written recently in the 
New York Times : 
During the past month, clashes between 
Communist guerrillas and Thai security forces 
in border areas along the Mekong River have 
become more frequent and bloodier. The 
change, United States sources believe, is 
attributed both to more aggressive counter­
measures and to Communist efforts to spread 
terrorism. North Vietnam and Communist China,
it is believed, have ordered the 18-month 
old Thailand United Patriotic Front to 
launch a major effort now--for tactical 
reasons tied to Vietnamese war. 
Although opinions vary, some specialists
believe that the current terrorist activity 
is aimed primarily at forcing Bangkok to 
1.imit its support for the United States 
effort in Vietnam. It is also believed 
Hanoi and Peking want to discourage Thailand 
from providing bases for any ground thrust 
aimed at cutting the vital Ho Chi Minh trail 
through neighboring Laos. United States ·air­
craft are already attacking the trail as well_ 
as North Vietnam from Thai bases. (New York 
Times, June 26, 19 66) 
The nature and extent of Communist-supported insurrec­
tion in the Northeast has yet to be determined, but to date 
it remains small. However, the Thai government ' s  attitude 
towards any political opposition in the Northeast has been 
to treat it as insurrection activity. No provision exists 
for the expression of legitimate regional grievances, and
desires cannot be expressed through any existing group of 
political representatives sanctioned by the central govern­
ment. 
Despite the lack of political channels for communica­
tion from the Isan populace to the central government, the 
Government has recognized the need to bring about relatively 
rapid economic development in the Northeast lest the economic 
aspects of the ''northeastern problema'' continue to be a 
major cause of discontent in the Isan countryside . The first 
major governmental program for the development of the North-
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east came in 1961 when the government promulgated a five­
year plan for the development of the region· with the 
following objectives: 
l. To improve water control and supply. 
2. To improve means of transport and .communica­
tion. 
3. To assist villages in increasing production 
and marketing.
4. To provide power for regional industrial de­
velopment and (later) rural electrification. 
5. To encourage private industrial and commercial 
development in the region. 
6. To promote community development, educational 
facilities, and public health programs at the 
local level. 
(Thailand, Committee on Development of the North­
east, 1961 : 1-2) . 
This plan, although by no means the first effort of the 
government of Thailand to deal with the problems of the
Northeast, was the first government-sponsored plan designed
specifically for the improvement of the region not subsumed 
in some larger national scheme. When the plan was first 
made public, _the government announced that it would be 
spending about $300,000,a000 on its implementation over the 
next five years ( 1962-1966). The money to finance such a 
large undertaking was to come, in great part, from U. S. aid 
grants (New York Times, April 14, 1962h 
Since the plan was first published in 1961 a North­
eastern Committee in the National Economic Development 
Board, Prime Minister' s Office, has been charged with 
supervising, coordinating, or carrying out research in the 
Isan region in order to bring the original proposals more
in line with the existing realities.a8 The implementation 
of the program, however, has been divided between a large 
number of agencies, departments and ministries with overall 
coordination supplied theoretically by the Ministry of 
National Development and the Prime Minister ' s  Office. The 
United States Operations Mission to Thailand (part of the 
United States Agency for International Development) has 
devoted a large share of its resources to assist those 
Thai governmental bodies working on northeastern develop­
ment plans. 
Among the more striking consequences of aid to the
Northeast has been the improvement of the regiona' s  economic 
infrastructure. Completion of the Friendship Highway, 
which was built at a cost of $20 million (almost all from 
American sources), connecting Bangkok with Khorat with 
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N9ngkhai and other less spectacular highway and communica­
tion connections have followed quite logically from the 
desire, expressed first in King Culalongk9n'as reign, to 
reduce the isolation of the region from the Central Plains. 
By 1 9 6 2  there were over 6 5 , 0 0 0  commerc.ial vehicles in Thai­
land, 5 0 , 0 0 0  registered in places other than. Bangkok.
Although no figures are available, the Northeast must account
for a sizeable percentage of the commercial vehicles regis­
tered up-country since much of the trade of the Central 
Plains is carried on by vehicles registered in Bangkok. This
statistic contrasts sharply with a pre-war ( 19 3 9 )  total of 
5,100 commercial vehicles which were most la�kely to have 
been located almost exclusively in Bangkok. In 19 6 0  addi­
tional communication links were made possible through the 
inauguration of air service by the Thai Airways Corporation 
to several northeastern towns. By 19 6 3  there were regular
flights between Bangkok and Nakh9n Phanom, Ubon, Kh9nkaen, 
and Ud9n. Communication networks have likewise been ex­
panded. For example, radio tele-communications between 
Bangkok and Ubon were established for the first time in 1 9 6 3  
(Bangkok World, January 21, 1 9 6 4) . 
The government, again using American aid funds, has 
begun the construction of irrigation and multi-purpose dams 
as part of the large international scheme for the eventual 
harnessing of the power of the Maekhong and its tributaries. 
The two most important dams being constructed at the moment 
are the multi-purpose Nam Pong project in Kh9nkaen which is 
expected to provide both water control and electrical power
for the central provinces of the region and the Lam Pao 
project in Kalasin which together with the Nam Pong Dam are
designed to provide effective irrigation for most of the 
Chi River basin. 
Although these large projects have brought and will 
continue to bring increased economic benefits to the populace 
of the Northeast, such advantages seem rather remote to most 
villagers. Since it is in the villages that the government 
feels attempts at subversion will be begun, the government 
has also initiated a wide variety of programs designed to 
bring immediate economic help to the Isan countryside. The
first program designed primarily with this region in mind 
was the Community Development program, which came into
existence in 19 6 0 .  By 1 9 6 4 ,  1,  800  northeastern villages 
were to be included in the - community development program 
(Platenius 19 6 3 : 111)  . With an increase in reported insur­
rectionist activity in the past few years, the Thai govern­
ment, and its advisers in the United States OperationsaMission, 
be an to fear that the community development program and 
otier development schemes for the rural Isan region might
not stimulate development rapidly enough to offset the 
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possible blandishments of cadres from the Thai Patriotic 
Front. Recently,  most development programs for northeast­
ern villages have been subsumed in a coordinated and
centralized "Accelerated Rural Development" program. The 
military has also been involved in village-level develop­
ment programs with its "Mobile Development Unit.s" (MDU)a. 
These units , composed of military personnel , doctors , gov­
ernment agents , and occasionally,  an American observer or 
participant , go into villages in selected areas and couple
medical treatment and economic development advice and 
examples with information about the government and about
the objectives of Communism. These units have usually been 
located in the most "sensitive" regions of the Northeast. 
The MDU program most clearly points out the govern­
menta' s  belief that economic development cannot be imple­
mented effectively without the securing of village loyalty. 
In fact all of the rural development schemes include as an 
essential part of their program the bringing of information 
designed to increase villagersa' sense of attachment to Thai­
land and to the Thai government. For similar purposes the 
government has increased its radio service to the Northeast 
with stations located in Kh9nkaen , Ubon , Ud9n , Sak9n Nakh9n , 
and Khorat. All these methods for making the Isan populace 
more conscious of its sense of belonging to Thailand add to 
the traditional methods of education and local administra­
tion which in the past contributed to the villagersa' sense 
of belonging to the Thai state. 
To what extent can the three-pronged attack on the 
Thai "northeastern problem , "  including suppression of po­
litical opposition , the rapid expansion of economic devel­
opment programs , and the accelerated attempts to integrate 
the Isan populace into the Thai state , succeed in pre­
venting the development of feared widespread and organized 
militant opposition of Northeasterners to control by the 
central Thai government? This question , which is posed in 
various guises by numerous Thai government officials , Ameri­
can advisers , and newspaper reporters , begs several questions 
about the nature of the "northeastern problem" which we have 
tried to trace here. Most importantly , it fails to take 
into account that for all the manifestations of northeast­
ern regionalism , few Northeasterners , including even some 
of the most radical political leaders , have sought to work 
out the destiny of the Isan region outside the context of
the Thai national social system. To put this in the baldest 
terms , Isan regionalism has not precluded Thai nationalism
among the northeastern population. To understand this we
need to examine the types of loyalties, and the interrela­
tionship of these loyalties, which most Northeasterners 
hold. 
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VII. ISAN REGIONALISM AND THAI NATIONALISM 
Since the fall of Vientiane in 182 7 the whole of 
Northeast Thailand has been included within the domains of 
the Siamese kingdom and has been brought increasingly under 
Siamese control. As Thai power and influence was extended 
into this region the recognition has grown on the part of 
the Isan people that they are distinctively different, eth­
nically, politically, and economically, from the Central 
Thai. Yet for all the manifestations of northeastern re­
gionalism which have appeared, especially since the Second 
World War, and despite the belief of many Siamese officials,
past and present, there has never been any widely-held 
sentiment abroad in the region which would favor Isan sepa­
ratism or union with Laos. Rather, the majority of North­
easterners see themselves as belonging to a unified society
in which both Isan and Siamese culture are legitimate
guides for social action, although at different levels. 
Isari peasants and townspeople· alfke subscribe to two 
"conscious models" of social behavior. For the majority
of the northeastern populace there exists an "immediate 
model" which is the Isan "subgroup's model of its own socio­
cultural system as they believe it to be'' ( Ward 1 9 6 5 : 12 4 ) .  
This model varies little between Northeasterners and the Lao 
of Laos, but �iffers from the "immediate model" held by
Central Thai. 
The Isan distinguish between their "immediate" model 
which provides a relevant guide to action within the local 
context and an "ideological" model (Ward 1 96 5 : 12 5 )  or concep­
tion of the elite socio-cultural patterns which are relevant 
in the larger context of national society. Although the 
"ideological" model varies somewhat from group to group, all 
Northeasterners would agree in terming their idea of elite 
culture "Thai.e" As the Isan populace conceives of it, elite 
culture emanates from the Thai kingship and is transmitted 
by government civil servants, whose generic name in Siamese 
is "royal servant" ( kha ratchakan) ,  and high-ranking members 
of the Buddhist order, the Sangha. 
The importance of the Thai kingship cannot be under­
estimated in considering the loyalties of the Isan populace.
In the recent historical past which the northeastern popu­
lace is aware of through oral tradition and legend, the Thai 
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kings have had more important roles than kings of neigh­
boring territories. The introduction of mass education has
further expanded the familiarity of the Isan populace with 
the symbols and history of the Thai kingship. Today the 
northeastern people, along with the majority of other
peoples in Thailand, see the Thai king as standing at the 
apex of the socio-cultural universe. 
structurally, the king is the supreme patron of Thai 
Buddhism; as such he is empowered to appoint the highest
clerical official in the kingdom, the Supreme Patriarch of 
the Buddhist Church. More importantly, perhaps, the king 
represents to all subjects in Thailand the most "meritorious" 
layman in the kingdom, for his position, gained through 
merit acquired in past existences, makes possible his 
ability to make more merit than any other layman. In the 
Thai kingship is seen the only temporal power of consequence, 
namely that of acting as patron of the religion and the 
Sangha. Furthermore, as the supreme embodiment of other­
worldly values, the king is deemed to possess mana-like 
powers which can be
3
drawn upon through ceremonial contact 
with royal symbols. 
The civil service, which has preserved a remarkable 
in9ependence and esi>rit de corps despite the numerous cou sad' etat and shifts in the ruling elite, is still conceive 
of as being legitimized by the kingship. Only if one accepts
the Thai king as the ultimate focus of the political system 
can one also accept the exercise of power by "servants" of 
the king. 
To rise within the socio-cultural system, which is 
polarized between king and peasants, one must perforce move 
closer to the king. There are two avenues whereby villagers, 
from the Northeast or other parts of Thailand, can become 
socially mobile - through the government bureaucracy (both 
civil and military) or through the Sangha. Members of both, 
at least from the district level on up, conform outwardly 
to "Thai" modes of behavior, no matter what their origin. 
The association of the civil service and the Sangha with 
the Thai kingship and the attractions of upward social 
mobility make understandable the admiration which Isan 
villagers have for "Thai" elite culture. 
It is within the framework provided by these two 
"conscious models," one Isan, the second "Thai," held by 
almost all Northeasterners, that Isan regionalism must be 
seen. Rather than leading Northeasterners to seek a sepa­
rate political destiny, the uses of Isan regionalism have 
been directed towards improving the status of the Isan 
people within the national order. It should be noted that, 
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insofar as I have been able to ascertain, insurrectionist 
elements do not base their appeal on separatist sentiments 
but upon the "neede" to overthrow the Central Thai government,
excluding the k ing who is rarely, if ever, mentioned in anti-
government propaganda. · 
The success of the current solutions to thee·e••northeast­
ern probleme" depends not only upon the degree to which devel­
opment alleviates the feelings of economic and ethnic dis­
crimination towards the Northeast, but also on t.he degree to 
which adherents of Isan regionalism continue to be persuaded 
to work for their objectives within the existing system. In 
the latter sense there is a danger that some of the govern­
ment policies towards the Northeast could engender a ''backlash'' 
effect. For one, continued suppression of indigenous poli­
tical opposition without concomitant mechanisms whereby such 
opposition can legitimately present its wishes in a nateional 
forum could drive more and more northeastern political leaders. 
underground. Political liberalization including the re-. 
establishment of the National Assembly, as promised by Thanom, 
could reduce this danger. As Wilson·ehas· pointed out: 
The National Assembly provides a possible 
pathway for provincial notables to main­
tain positions of prestige_ in the capital 
and to g ive vent to their regional grievances. 
To the extent that the assembly performs this 
functeion, it is an apparatus which links 
parts of the country to the center and in 
large measure siphons off pressures which 
might lead to the development of more iras­
cible proponents of localism. · (Wilson 
1962 : 2 15-6) 
S imilarly, the massive intrusion of Central Thai 
officials, both civilian ande- m ilitary, into the Northe_ast for 
development purposes has a possible danger, ironically, of 
providing fuel to the appealeof the insurrectionists. As.
one American adviser has noted in connection w ith government 
development -programs in the Northeast: 
Village development requires that an in­
creased number of contacts be made between 
villagers and government officeials who are . .. .promoting government-conceived programs � 
These officials will often have to carry 
out orders in the face of village apathy 
and opposition and some friction between the 
two parties inevitably will occur. (Harmon 
1964 : 2 )  
\ 
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An essential point here is that a rapid program of develop­
ment could bring many Central Thai to the Northeast who 
might know little or even care little about local culture. 
The resultant contacts which the Isan people have with 
Central Thai officials could exacerbate rather than allevi­
ate traditional regional sentiments of distrust of the 
Central Thai. 
Further , economic development rapidly implemented is 
bound to include many mistakes and partial failures which 
also could create further questions in the minds of the 
northeastern populace as to the effectiveness of the Central 
Government. In the case of the Mobile Development Units , 
for examplea, selection of a particular village for the ap­
plication of development schemes has caused resentment in 
neighboring villages which were not chosen as sites for 
development. 
Another factor which could bode ill for the govern­
ment's objectives in the Northeast is the presence of 
American military bases in the region. Although the impact 
of these bases on the local economy and upon the attitudes 
of Northeasterners towards Americans has yet to be assesseda, 
the sheer numbers involved can not but have some impression
on the Northeast. If the presence of the Americans causes 
economic and ·social dislocation through the immediate , but 
short-lived , intrusion of money into the Isan economy , 
government development projects designed to bring more per­
manent economic improvements to the area could suffer. In 
another vein the American bases , used as they are for 
missions over Laos and Vietnam , present a tempting target 
for supporters of the Viet Cong or Pathet Lao. Consequently, 
as Peter Braestrup suggested (New York Times , June 26 ,  19 66), 
the Communists may work even harder at increasing the "in­
surrectionist" movement in the Northeast. 
None of the factors I have mentioned are insurmount­
able barriers to solving the "northeastern problem.a" The 
present Thai government is on record as favoring elections. 
If held , these could alleviate to some extent the political 
aspects of the problem. Also , as the government has more 
experience with its development programs, mistakes can be 
better avoided. But more important than what the central 
government might do to alleviate the problems of the re­
gion is the existing recognition on the part of the north­
eastern populace that their destiny lies with Thailand. 
Loyalty to the Thai king still supersedes regional or ethnic 
loyalty, and although northeastern regionalism probably 
will not disappear within the next few years , it need not 
present the grave danger that is often portrayed. 
FOOTNOTES 
Chapter I 
1. No figures are available on how many Thai-Khmer live
in the Northeasta. However, Mr . Frank Huffman, who 
has worked with Khmer-speaking people in Thailand, 
has given me an estimate of about 400,000. 
2 .  The term T' ai is used to indicate any people belonging 
to the T' ai language family. Such people are found 
from Assam in the West to Hainan Island in the East, 
and from Southern China in the North to Malaya in the 
South (LeBar et al, 19 64:187-244). Consequently,
T'ai does notsimply refer to people whoa- are living
within the present-day Kingdom of Thailand. The term 
Thai shall be used to refer to the people of the 
Central Region of Thailand, alternatively referred to 
as the Central Thai or the Siamese. 
3 .  I have sometimes also called the Northeasterners "Thai­
Lao.a" By this term, I mean the Lao who live in Thailand. 
4 .  The Central Thai or Siamese refer to themselves and are 
called by others in Thailand simply as khon thai (' Thai 
people' ) whereas the term for the region is phak klang 
(' central region' ). Northerners usually refer to them­
selves as khonmyang (' people of the land' ), but are 
also called ianna thai (' Thai of the kingdom of Lanna -
i.e.  Lanna' - that is Chiangmai) or khon lfian . The term 
for the northern region is p�ak Y� (*nor ern region' ) 
although in the past a Pali- ansQrit term for "north,a" 
phayap, was also useda. Finally, the people of the 
southern region are sometimes called �aktai (lit. , 
' southern mouth' ) while their region is called phak tai 
(' southern region ' ) .  
s.  Although Khorat (Nakhqn Ratchasima) is a major center 
in the Northeast, its geographical and cultural posi­
tion on the border between the Northeast and the Cen­
tral Plains precludes its being identified as repre­
senting the whole Northeast. 
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6. Phasa isan has two referents. The first , and most
widely recognized, refers to the written language used 
by publishing houses which print traditional north­
eastern literature. This language employs Siamese 
( rather than Lao) script , slightly modified for the 
different dialects, and northeastern vocabulary. The 
second is the '' standardized'' Isan language used on the 
various radio stations in the Northeast. 
Chapter II 
1. The following reconstruction of the history of the Khorat
Plateau is subject to a number of limitations and must 
be taken , thus , as a tentative statement of certain 
historical patterns. The problems of historiography 
alone , particularly for the period prior to the fall of 
Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 176 7 ,  are immense and lie 
beyond the competence of this author to deal with in 
detail in the short time and space allowed here. 
2. This is not the place to attempt a reconstruction of 
the ethnohistory of the Khorat Plateau prior to the 
arrival of T'ai-speaking people. However , it should 
be noted -that the Khmer element was not the only one 
present in the proto-hiastorical period. Archaeoalogical 
evidence suggests that both the Mons and the Chams had 
also been present to some extent in the region. 
3. That Ayutthaya should be the capital of a T ' ai-speaking 
kingdom thus gives rise to some puzzling questions. 
Professor O.W. Wolters has developed a very intriguing 
and plausible theory that the founding of Ayutthaya 
represented the merging of the fortunes and objectives 
of a Cao Phraya Valley T' ai kingdom lying to the west 
of Ayutthaya ( Suphanburi) with those of the Mon king­
dom of Lavo (Wolters 19 6 6). 
4. This account of the conquests of Fa Ngum is based on 
Maha Sila Viravong ( 19 64:26-34). Although the relia­
bility of this source is open to some question , the 
other main source ( Le Boulanger 19 31 : 41-51) provides 
sufficient collaboration to justify the claim that al­
most all of northeastern Thailand was brought within 
the domains of Fa Ngum ' s  kingdom. 
s. Several pieces of evidence support the thesis that
Ayutthaya did not exercise political control over any
part of the Northeast prior to the beginning of the 
1 7th century. In a listing of all known archaeologi-
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5. (continued)
cal sites in Thailand (Chin Yu Di 1957) , there is not 
one site which was built by Ayutthaya prior to the 
founding of Nakh9n Ratchasima. In his history of the 
provinces of Ubon, Sisaket, Surin, R9i-Et, Mahasarakham,
and Kalas in, Amorawong W ici t dismisses t.he pre-17th cen­
tury history of the Northeast in the following terms: 
"The lands of Monthon Lao Kao [i. e. , the area comprising
the above mentioned provinces] before 1638 was a jungle 
inhabited by forest people who traced their lineage from 
the Kh9m [i. e. ,  the Khmer of the Angkorian empire]" 
(Amorawong Wicit 1963:22). Finally, in my examination 
of the histories of each northeastern province given in 
booklets prepared fora.athe 2500 year anniversary of 
Buddha's enlightenment, I could again find no reference 
to Siamese control over northeastern areas prior to the 
founding of Nakh9n Ratchasima. 
6. The dating of the. foundation of the "shrine of two friend­
ships" at Dan Sai is open· to some question. In the in­
scription found at the site (Finot 1915), the date given 
is 1560 A. D. and the two kings in question are given as
Thammikarat of Vientiane and Maha Cakkraphat of Ayutthaya. 
Maha Sila's version of the Lao Annals claims that this 
stele .was erected in 1670 A. D. during the reign of one 
Suryawongsa-Thammikarat (Maha s ·ila Viravong 19 64: 76-77) 
and that in 1485 a treaty by Ayutthaya and Lan Chang. had 
been signed at the same place (Ibid. , p. 47) . The name
of the Siamese king or kings is not given in Maha Sila'as 
version. In Wood's History of Siam, nq reference is 
made to this treaty having been concluded during the 
reign of King Cakkraphat (Wood 1928:112-123) . 
7. For the detailed history of the event·s culminating in the 
founding of the three Lao kingdoms see Maha Sila Viravong 
(19 64:83-5, 106-8) ; Archaimbault (1961); Le Boulanger 
(1934:131-5); and ''Toem Singhatthit'' (1956, vol. 1:352 et 
passim) . 
a. Nakh9n . (Khorat) had already proven itself toRatchasima 
be somewhat reluctantly part of the Siamese kingdom. In 
1691 and again in 1699 revolts against Ayutthayan rule
had broken out at Khorat, although each time the rebellion 
had been put down (Wood 1924:220,222; Manit Vallibhotama 
1962:18-19) .  
9. For the best description and analysis of the events 
leading up to and including this invasion of Vientiane 
see Wyatt (19 63:14-21) . 
10. During the reign of King Taksin (1767-1782) the Siamese 
capital was on the Cao Phraya river at Thonburi. After 
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10. (continued)
Taksin was replaced by General Cakkri, the capital was 
moved to the opposite bank of the river in Bangkok. 
11. The kings of the Bangkok dynasty founded by Cakkri are
often referred to as Rama I, Rama II, etc. King Cakkri 
was Rama I and the present king, Phumiphon Adunladet, 
is Rama IX. 
12. More research needs to be carried out on the events 
that took place in the Northeast during the Siamese­
Lao war of 1827-8. It is known that Khorat remained 
loyal to Bangkok for one of the most popular stories to 
come out of the conflict concerned the actions of the 
wife of the assistant-governor of Khorat who rallied 
the people of Khorat against the Lao (Manit Vallibho­
tama 19 62:25-6). This woman, Thao Suranari (or Thao 
Mo) is the only "northeasterner" who is given an import­
ant place in Thai (Siamese) history (cf. the 3rd grade 
primary textbook, Thailand, Ministry of Education,
Department of Educational Techniques, 1961:5 7-9). How­
ever, little is known who: the other rulers of north­
eastern principalities supported, although it is likely 
that some of them had to provide food and corv�e labor 
for both the Lao and the Siamese. 
1 3. For a good summary of the events leading immediately 
up to the Vientiane revolt of 1827 see Wyatt (196a3:27-
31). For a statement of the Thai version of the revolt 
see Vella (1957: 80-89) and "Toem Singhathit" (195 6:vol. 
1:a149-159). A Lao interpretation of the revolt is 
given by Maha Sila Viravong (1964:111-135). 
14. In a document prepared at the height of a period of 
Thai irredentism in 1941, the Thai government listed as 
losses to the French of 87,000 square kilometers in the 
Sips9ng Chao Thai (or Sips9ng Cu Thai) region of
present-day north Vietnam, 175,000 square kilometers in 
Cambodia, and 207,500 square kilometers in Laos (Thai­
land, Department of Publicity, 1941:no page). Of these 
areas only the Lao areas, less the territory of Luang 
Prabang, and the provinces of Battambang, Siemrat, 
Sisophon and Melouprey in Cambodia were fully integrated 
into the Siamese kingdom at the time of the treaties 
with the French. The Siamese claim to the Sips9ng Chao 
Thai rested solely on the fact that the region was 
populated mainly by T'ai speaking people. Cambodia and 
Luang Prabang were vassals. Bangkok also lost to Britain 
some vassals in the Malay states, but did not lose any 
territory which was fully a part of the kingdom at the
•
time. 
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15. Some northern parts of Cambodia were also ceded to 
France in the Treaty of 1904. In 1907 the rest of 
Cambodia, the provinces of Siemreap, Battambang, and
Sisophon, were transferred from Siamese to French con­
trol. 
•
16. Among other aspects, these variations are evident in
the dialect differentiations which Brown found in the
Northeast (Brown 19 65). 
Chapter III 
1. The term myang does not have any one English gloss for 
it may mean country, prov�nce, city, or undefined area. 
Howeve �, the term huamyan� in which the word hua means ' head,' was applied speci icall� by - the Thai to small 
principalities comprising a single important center and 
subordinate villages or other centers. 
The four Ayutthayan huamyang included, besides Khorat 
(Nakh9n Ratchasima), Surin, Sangkha, and Khukahan. in the 
southern part of the Northeast on the Cambodian border. 
All three were created at the same time (1760) in con­
seque_nce of services rendered by the Suai (a Mon-Khmer 
minority group) leaders of the·se areas to the king of 
Ayutthaya (Can�wat Surin • • • 1957 : 8). In fact, the actual inclusion ofat ese territories within the Siamese king­
dom did not come until after the founding of the new 
dynasty at Tho nburi/Bangkok. 
3 .  The listing of the names of the huamyang, their founding 
dates, and the nature of their tributary position can be
found in "Toem Singhatthit" (1956 : vol. 1 :510-534). The 
lack of certainty as to how many of these huamyang lay
in what is today northeastern Thailand is a consequence 
of the difficulty in locating about seventeen of the names 
on maps of the area. At least three of these "Lao" 
huamyan� were situated in what is present-day Cambodia and ano her one was in the province of Lomsak which 
today i·s in northern Thailand. · 
4 .  An expanded description of the structure of the huam�. anJcan be found in "Toem Singhatthit" (1956:vol. 1 :488- 07 
and Bunchuai Atthak9n (1962). 
s .  In an interview with a descendant of the hered:i:ary ruling 
family of the northeastern province of Mahasarakham, I 
1earned that prior to the reign of King Culalongk9n 
(1868-1910) the huam�ang comprising much of what ·is 
present-day Mahasara ham province sent a supply of wild 
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5. 
6 .  
7. 
8 .  
( continued) 
cardamon as tribute to Bangkok. Following the ascen­
sion to the throne of Culalongk9n in 1868 Mahasarakham 
shifted to tribute in silver. By 1883-4 , according to 
a French official who made an extensive trip throughout
the Northeast during these years (Aymonier .189 5 ; 189 7) , 
most of the h·ua:myang in the Khorat Plateau were sending
tribute in silver , although a few such as Dan Sai , 
Sangkha , and Buriram were still sending such specialties 
as sticklac , beeswax, and cardamon. According to the 
same source, the tribute which varied according to the 
population size of the huamyan�, consisted of head �axes. 
These taxes apparently suffice to satisfy the corvee 
requirement as well since there is no record of corvee 
being raised in the Northeast after the Lao-Siamese 
engagement of 1827-28. 
This fourfold grouping of huam�ang was divided as follows: the Northern or Laoa huan division included 
16 maj or huamyang under a commissaioner at N9ngkhai. The 
Eastern or Lao Kao division included 11 huamyant under a commissioner at Campasak. The Northeastern or ao Isan 
division included 12 maj or huamyang under a commissioner 
at Ubon , and the Central or Lao Klang division included 
three major huamyani with a commissioner at Khorat. Each 
of the first three included territories which today li� 
in both present-day Laos and northeastern Thailand. 
These four were on a par ,  administratively , with three 
other groupings of huam¥ang: one in northern Thailand based on Chiangmai ,  ano her in the South based on Phuket , 
and a third in territories today in Cambodia based on 
Sisophon ("Toem Singhatthit" 19 5 6: vol. 1: 5 08-5 3 7 ;  
Bunchuai Atthak9n 19 62: 69 ; Damrong 196 0: 81-86). 
The monthon established in the Lao areas reflected the 
loss of territories on the left bank of the Maekhong. 
Whereas there had been four groupings of huamyang 
prior to 189 3 ,  there were only three monthon. Further­
more , because of a provision in the Franco-Siamese 
treaty of 189 3 forbidding the Siamese to have fortified 
ports or military establishments within 25 kilometers 
of the Maekhong (Thailand , Department of Publicity , 
1941: 49) ,  the headquarters of two of the northeastern 
monthon were transferred to new places. The three 
northeastern monthon were Khorat centered on Nakh9n 
Ratchasima ; Isan centered on Ubon (rather than Campasak) , 
and Ud9n centered on Ud9n (rather than N9ngkhai). 
Some evidence for this assertion comes from interviews
with the descendants of the cao myang families of 
Kalasin and Mahasarakham and from Bunchuai Atthak9na' s  
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a. (continued) 
history of Mahasarakham (1962) . In Mahasarakham the 
governor from 1912-1916 was a member of the Thai royal 
family (Bunchuai Atthak9n 1962 : 82) and he was succeeded 
by another Bangkok Thai (Ibid. , p. 86) •a. However , more 
research needs to be done on the origins of provincial 
and district officials in the Northeast for the crucial 
period of Thai history between the 1890 ' s  and 1932 
before any conclusive generalization on this subject can 
be made. 
9. However , it took until 1955 for the rail line to rea6h 
N9ngkhai , the main port of entry for the Lao capital of
Vientiane (Bangkok Post , September 2 3 ,  1955) .  
10. For brief descriptions of the traditional system of
education for all of Thailand see Wyatt (1966) and for 
the system in a northeastern village see Keyes (1966a: 
140-2) . 
Chapter I V  
1. An incident which occurred in the province of Mahasarakham 
at this time also reflects the confusion which followed 
the coup. Attempting to take advantage of the new situa­
tion , a travelling folk opera singer , known as M9lam N9i 
( ' little folk opera singer ' )  .tried to stir up the popu-
lace against the government and advocated such policies 
as non-paymat of taxes , non-conformance with regulations 
requiring children to go to school , and cessation of
paying obeissance to the monks because "the Sangha of 
today is not composed of real priests'' (Bunchuai Atthak9n 
1962 : 95 ) .  M9lam N9i planned to resurrect the Kingdom of
Vientiane , of which he would become king. The Lao , 
including Northeasterners , would be divided between this 
kingdom and another in Khorat under a M9m Ratchawong Sanit 
(who was not further identified) also as a king. Both
kingdoms , M9lam N9i declared , would be independent of 
Bangkok. M9lam N9i attacted a following through his 
claims to be a pnu wiset ( ' one magically-endowed' ) who 
could fly throug the air and exercise other supernatural
powers. His efforts came to an abrupt halt in 193 3  when 
he was captured and was unable to escape by flying out of 
jail as his followers expected (Bunchuai Atthak9n 1962:96-7).  
M9lam N9i is but a minor example of a type of political 
leader who has appeared several times in Thai and Lao 
history at periods of political unrest. Compare , for 
example , this incident with the Bun Khuang rebellion in 
Khorat in 1699 (Wood 1924:222) and with the Phra Sa rebel­
lion in Campasak in 1815 (Maha Sila Viravong 1964:144-5) .  
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la . There is some evidence that the Thai governmente' s  fear 
of " Communist" activities in the l�ortheast at this 
time may have been connected with knowledge of the 
establishment of a Thai Communist Party in the early
1 9 3 0 ' s .  In 1 9 3 5  a Siamese delegate , with the im­
probable name of "Rashi , "  represented a Thai Communist 
Party for the first time at a meeting of the Comintern 
in Moscowe. In a speech which he delivered at the 
meeting he declared : 
We , the Communists of Siam , here at the Seventh 
Congress of the CI , for the first time have 
the good fortune to raise our voice and report
that in our small and distant country there 
already exists a CP , and a revolutionary
struggle is already developinge. We are not yet 
a section of the CI , we only request our ac­
ceptance into the great world union of Commu­
nists . ( U . S .  Department of State , 1 9 5 0 : 2 8 ) 
2 .  Thau ( thao) is a Lao title of respecte. Chin might per­
haps be the Thai and Lao word for Chinese (cin)e, but 
this is only speculativee. 
3 .  During the Vietnamese war against the French in the 
post Second World War period evert more Vietnamese 
refugees poured into northeasetern Thailand. These 
people have tended to be loyal to Ho Chi Minh and 
have, thus , been a source of worry to the pro-Western 
government. Howevere, despite the presence of a large
number of pro-DRV Vietnamese in the Northeast,  I do 
not believe that the " Vietnamese problem" is a compo­
nent of the "northeastern problem.e" There is too 
much ethnic antipathy between these two peoples for 
the Vietnamese to have any maj or political influence 
upon the Northeasternerse. 
4 .  For an English text of this plan see Landon ( 19 39 : 2 6 0 -
9 3 )  and for a discussion of it see Vella ( 19 5 5 : 3 73- 8 ) e. 
It should be noted that although the plan seems in 
Western eyes to be straightforward state socialism , 
within the Thai context it had different connotationse. 
Bureaucratic membership is aspired to by any Thai 
who wishes to advance socially in the secular world.  
Thuse, making all people employees of the state would 
confer this status on all. 
5 .  Information on the origin and activities of pre-war 
representatives in the National Assembly is extremely
difficult to find. What data does exist usually
relates only to the most prominent MP's . 
6.  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 . 
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For a brief descri�tion of the war and thea. subsequent
negotiationsa· see Vella ( 1955 :  381-4), Landon ( 1941), and 
Crosby ( 19 45 :  117-121) . For a Thai nationalist view
written shortly after the war see Maha Sivaram ( 1941) . 
Direck Jayana, then deputy minister of foreign affairs, 
is quoted in an article by Landon ( 1941 : 39 )  as having
given the following justification for Thailanda' s  actions: 
As it is evident that the action of the French 
in compelling Thailand to give up the Thai na­
tural frontier, the Mekong river, renders our 
frontier devoid of strategic security, the most 
important object of government must be to secure 
the return of the Thai original frontiers so 
that Thailand may be in a position to enjoy peace
and happiness and need not fear danger from any 
other power • • •  If reference is made to • • •  the ra­
cial principle, it is clearly evident that the 
fact that ·Thailand should have the Mekong river 
as the frontier conforms in all respects to _this 
racial principle. It is already well known that 
the people who live in that region are of the 
same race and blood as the Thais. 
One illustration of the importance of northeastern poli­
ticians in the Free Thai movement can be found in the 
fact that in 1944 Thawin Ud9n (R9i-Et) was sent as repre­
sentative of the Free Thai to the Chinese Government in 
Chungking (Smith and Clark 19 45-6:193). Among the other 
northeastern MP's who were involved in the Free Thai Move­
ment were Camlqng Daor�ang (Mahasarakham), Tiang and his 
brother Thiam Sirikhan (Sak9n Nakh9n), Th9ng-in and his 
brother Thim Phuriphat (Ubon), F9ng Sitthitham (Ubon),
Liang Chaiyakan (Ubon), Kwa�aTh9ngthawi (Kalasin). The 
last three were more follower$ of Khuang Aphaiwong than 
Pridi and later joined Khuang in founding the Democrat· Party. 
An informant from Petchabun who had been born i:n the vil­
lage in _aMahasarakhan in which I did research claimed that 
most of the conscript labor for the Petchabun scheme was 
from the Northeast. Whether or not this is true, other 
villagers believed it was so and, in consequence, held 
Phibun in low esteem. 
Information on the activities of northeastern politicians
just prior to the end of the war and in the immediate post­
war period is taken, unless otherwise indicated, primarily 
from Thompson and Adloff's file on "Who's Who in Southeast 
Asia"· ( 19 45-50). This file, a microfilm of which exists 
in the Cornell University Library, is in turn based on 
press reports appearing in Bangkok in the 1945-50 period. 
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There are many limitations to using this file , but as 
it provides the only information on the period (files 
of Bangkok newspapers being unavailable)a, I have had 
no choice but to draw heavily upon it , checking against 
other reports where possible. 
11. The prime ministers in this period were Khuang Aphaiwong
(August 1944-August 1945 and again from January 19 46-
March 19 46) , Seni Pramot , who had been the Free Thai 
Movement's leader in the United States during the war 
(September 19 45-January 19 46) , Pridi himself (March­
August 19 46) , and Pridi's protege , Thamrong Nawasawat 
(August 1946-November 19 47)a. Both Khuang and Seni were 
to break with Pridi after March 19 46. 
12. Darling has claimed , without citing a source , that "The 
Cooperative Party [was] composed la�gely of Free Thai 
politicians from the poverty-stricken northeastern 
provinces" (Darling 19 65 : 4 7) .  Another political party , 
the Constitutional Front , also supported Pridi. 
1 3 .  Shortly after the war the Khmer independence movement , 
called the Khmer Issarak , received Thai support and 
"set up a Committee to co-ordinate their activities in
-Bangkok'' (Lancastera, 196 1 : 1 35) . After French forces 
retook Vientiane on April 24 , 19 46 , thus completing 
their reconquest of Laos , the leadership of the Lao 
Independence Movement (Lao Issara) fled to Bangkok and 
set up a government-in-exile there (Dammen 19 65 :27) .  
The Viet Minh set up a news agency in Bangkok and a
headquarters for the purchase of arms (Tanham 19 6 1 : 6 7) .  
Hernard Fall has claimed that most of the arms pur­
chases made by the Viet Minh in Bangkok were from the 
United States (Fall 19 6 4 : 70 ,  465  nl4). 
14. At the time Le Hi was the editor of the weekly , Viet­
nam News Bulletin , which was published in Bangkok, and
Tran Van Giao was the former head of the Provisional 
Executive Committee of Cochin-China (Thompson and Adloff
1950 : 234-5) . The other two officers of the League , both 
Thai , were Manot Watthitya (Assistant Secretary) and 
Sukhit Nimmanhemin (Librarian). Although neither of 
the latter two were themselves Northeasterners ,  both 
had close contacts with Tiang Sirikhan. Representatives
of Cambodia, Indonesia , Burma , and Malaya also signed 
the manifesto proclaiming the objectives of the 
League (Vietnam Information Service , 194 7 : 7-8) . 
15. For a recent (pro-Pridi) assessment of Anandaa' s  death and 
the subsequent political ramifications , see Kruger (19 6 4) .  
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16. On the founding of the Prachachon Party, Coast has given 
this description: 
In mid�l947 a serious split occurred among the 
Democrats' fifty-nine Assembly members when Nai 
Liang Jayakal [Liang Chaiyakan, MP from Ubon] 
formed the Prachachon, or Peoplee' s  Party and 
took it into the Pridi camp • • •  Liang claimed 
that his group was not attached to anybody, and 
that only his convictions had caused him to 
leave the Democrats ; the Democrats, however, 
charged the split had been bought by Pridi. 
( Coast 1953: 38) 
However, whether Liang was still pro-Pridi at the time 
of the 1948 election is doubtful since he was shortly
to organize an opposition in the Assembly which assumed 
pro-Phibun characteristics. Liang Chaiyakan, one of the 
most durable of the Isan MP ' s  having been elected in 
every election from 1933 on, switched party allegiances 
at very opportune times. After the War, he was an 
organizer of the Democrat Party. When Pridi was firmly
in power, he broke with the Democrats and joined in 
supporting Pridi. After the 1948 elections he became a 
supporter of Phibun and subsequently became a cabinet.
minister in Phibun's government. 
17. Another northeastern MP, F9ng Sitthitham, one of the 
main northeastern leaders of the Democrat party, was 
also arrested at this time. Although he was later re­
leased, the inclusion in the arrests of a northeastern 
MP who was not a follower of Pridi reflects the extent 
to which the government had come to believe that the 
Isan region was a haven for sedition. 
18. Professor Lauriston Sharp who was engaged in field research 
in Thailand at the time of the "kilo 11" incident reports: 
that in Bangkok and villages near Kilometer 11,
there was general shocked disapproval of Phibun 
and his unpopular police over this " incident.e" 
For a time some passerby would salute the marker 
and for months peasants would express disapproval
of a person by saying "Send him to Kilo Elevene! "  
However, while not condoning the ''dirty business," 
peasants in nearby Bang Chan expressed the clear 
stereotype ( probably acquired from government 
radio broadcasts) that the northeastern leaders 
were "rebellious," "enemies of democracy," and 
"spreaders of Communism.e" ( Lauriston Sharp,
personal communication, March 1965) 
For another contemporary account of the "Kilo 11" inci­
dent see Roth ( 1949). 
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19. Defense Counsel for these men was Prayot Iamsila , later 
an MP from the northeastern province of Kh9nkaen. 
chapter V 
1. The rai , a standard unit of land measurement , is equal
to approximately 3/5 acres. 
2. Although paddy production has increased slightly in 
both regions since the early 1950'as ,  the same disparity
between regions still holds. In 19 60-1 the average
yield in the Central Plains was 231 kilograms per rai 
as compared with 15 3 kilograms per rai for the North­
east (Thailand , Ministry of Agriculture 1961:a39). 
3. Beginning in about 195 7  kenaf production became a 
major source of cash income in the Northeast. How­
ever , although the expansion of kenaf production 
helped the Isan peasantry narrow the gap between the 
Northeast and the Central Plains in commercial agri­
cultural production , the northeastern farm family con­
tinued to lag far behind the Central Thai peasant 
family in cash income from farm production. 
4. The baht is equal to approximately $U.aS. 0. 05. 
5. This statistic obtained from Skinner (195 7:a305) who 
in turn was quoting from an Economic and Demographic 
·asurvey of �angkok (Thailand,  Central Statistical 
Office , 1955:aTable 15-16). 
6. This point is somewhat difficult to substantiate 
statistically although most reports (Textor 19 61: 6- 7 ,  
12; Klausner 195 6: II ,  2; Long et al 19 63:100.-1) and 
my own research in a village inManasarakham province
indicate that northeastern villagers themselves claim
that the migrant group from the rural areas is made up 
primarily of young men. In the 1960 census there is 
some indication of this in the lower percentage of 
males in the age group 20-29 in the Northeast (16.a3 
per cent) as compared with similar figures from other 
regions (17.2 per cent in the North , 17.3 per cent in 
the South , and 17. 6 per cent in the East) and the whole 
country (17.0 per cent). 
7. For other information on the phenomena of "temporary 
migration" of northeastern villagers to Bangkok , see 
Textor (1961) , Kirsch (1966) , Klausner (1956: I ,  16; 
II , 1-3) , Kickert (19 60: 2) and Long et al (19 63:100-1). 
It should be noted that B angkok has iiotoeen the only 
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7. ( continued) 
place which has attracted Isan peasants in search of wage 
labor, but only those who have migrated to Bangkok and,
to a lesser extent , those who have gone to other places
in the Central Plains are of interest here. 
s. I have found mention of three different occasions when 
a rally of Northeasterners in Bangkok was called by
Isan representatives : January 19 4 9 ,  December 1950  (both
described in Thompson and Adloff 19 45-5 0 )  and February
19 5 7  (Bangkok Post, Februarya_ 7, 195 7 )  . 
9 .  In this period the government controlled rice exports 
through three organizations (two Chinese and one govern­
ment controlled). The rice millers in the Northeast 
complained that they were not being allotted sufficient 
rolling stock to transport their rice and that they were 
forced to pay a fee ("security money") for quality con­
trol performed in Bangkok. These factors, the rice 
millers claimed, led to a reduction in profit and 
created conditions of unfair competition with rice firms 
in other parts of the country. In November 1 9 4 8  all 6 9  
rice merchants in the Northeast banded together to pro­
test to the government and finally a compromise was
ostensibly reached in February 1949  (Bangkok Post, Feb­
ruary 1 4 ,  19 49 ) . However, in July the issue was raised 
again in the Parliament by .several Isan deputies thus 
suggesting the compromise had not been successful. 
Sharp has made the following observation on this problem: 
While the entire dispute may be seen in the 
large as a calculated effort to loosen the 
grip of Chinese rice merchants on Thailand' s 
economy, such incidents have furnished 
excellent grist for the local political 
mills of the Northeast and provide a factual 
basis for their claims of geographic discrim­
ination by the central government. (Lauriston 
Sharp, unpublished manuscript, 1951)  
10 . According to Thompson and Adloff' s files (Thompson and 
Adloff 19 45-50 )  the four were llat Ngoenthap (Independent, 
Mahasarakham), Ch¥n Rawiwan (Sahathai - that is, a
follower of Pridi and Tiang Sirikhan, Nqngkhai), F9ng 
Sitthitham (Democrat, Ubon), and Y9ngyut Ph¥nphop ..
(Sahathai, Ud9n). 
11. As a major northeastern political leader Thep Chotinuchit 
is something of · an anomaly. According to a brief biog­
raphy given by Wilson ( 19 5 9  : 314-5 )  , Thep was born a son 
of a government official in the Central Thai province of 
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11. ( continued) 
Nakh9n Pathom. He was a graduate of the Law Institute 
in Bangkok and later received an M . A .  from Thammasat 
University. He was appointed a judge in 19e3 7  and 
shortly thereafter elected to Parliament from Sisakete. 
This is the first mention of his connection with Sisa­
ket province which he was to represent, with an inter­
lude between 19e3 8  and 1 9 4 7, until Sarit abolished the 
Parliament in 19 5 8 .  What his connections with Sisaket 
were to ensure him the popularity which he enj oyed 
there is not clear. Although born and educated in 
Central Thailand and although his brother, Pethai, was 
an important figure in Thonburi politics, Thep has been 
one of the strongest advocates of northeastern causese. 
12e. It is probable that all of the votes which Thep re­
ceived were from among the 12e3 elected MP's since the 
appointed members of Parliament would undoubtedly have 
been Phibun supporters. 
1 3 .  These assertions are based upon knowledge of the past
affiliations of the MPe' s  in question, press reports of 
their campaigns, and subsequent actions which they
engaged in after the election. The " leftists" were 
joined later by a number of other _ Isan deputies, pri­
marily among those elected as Independentse. However, 
it is impossible to determine if any of these others 
had run on a leftist platform or whether they had 
j oined the left after being electede. 
1 4 .  Nai Liang was not so popular, however, with an audience 
of northeastern pedicab drivers whom he addressed in 
Bangkok j ust before the electione. He promised that if 
the government parties won the election, the govern-
ment would help the northeastern pedicab drivers or­
ganize an association and would provide them with welfare 
housing. One member of the audience asked why the 
government was only now interested in helping the 
northeastern pedicab drivers to organize an association 
as Isan people had been driving pedicabs in Bangkok for 
more than ten years and furthermore why was it only at 
election time that the government was proposing a pro­
gram of welfare housing when the drivers had requested
such housing a year ago. ''It was said that the crowd 
did not cheer [Nai Liang Chaiyakan]  but cheered the 
northeasterner who had questioned him" ( Bangkok Post, 
February 7, 19 5 7). 
15e. The percentage was not so high in the February 1 9 5 7  
election when 40 per cent of those who had been MP ' s  
after the 1 9 5 2  election were re-elected. Of the 5 3  
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15. ( continued)
representatives chosen in the December 19 5 7  election , 
13 had been elected in both 1952 and February 195 7, 16 
had been elected in February 195 7 but not in 1952, and 
18  were newly elected in December 195 7 .  
16. Among the twenty�one deputies at this meeting there 
were six from leftist parties , eight from pro-government 
partiese, and four independents. 
Chapter VI 
1. The main leadership within the pro-government party for 
repealing the Anti-Communist Act came from Thim Phuri­
phat ( Ubon) and Woraphot Wongsang·ae, a deputy from Ud9n. 
2. Isan members of the pro-government party were most con­
spicuous in their participation in these trips. For 
example, in August 195 8 two pro-government MP ' s  ( Bancoet 
Saich¥a,  R9i-Et , and Burana Campaphan , Sisaket ) together
with three opposition MP's (To Kaeosena , Free Democrat , 
Buriram , Saing Marangkun , Free Democrat , Buriram , and 
Thawisak Triphli , Hyde Park Movement ,  Kh9nkaen) ,  all from 
the Northeaste, went to Communist China on an unauthorized
•
trip. 
3. Among those arrested were Thawisak Triphli ( Kh9nkaen , Hyde 
Park Movement , Klaeo Noraphat ( Kh9nkaen , Economist) ,  Thep 
Chotinuchit (Sisaket , Economist) ,  Yuang Iamsila (Ud9n , 
Free Democrat MP elected in February but not December) ,  
Pl¥ang Wansi ( Surin, Independent ) ,  and Ph9nchai Saengchat
( Sisaket , Economist) as well as Bancoet Saich¥a ( R9i-Et , 
National Socialist) who had visited China. 
4. A study of the military as a mechanism for social mobility
in Thailand is greatly needed. Among other things , the· 
military is one of the few groups in Thailand which has 
institutional identity. 
5. I have briefly discussed in another place ( Keyes 1 9 6 4 )
the interrelationships of Thai foreign policy towards 
Laos and internal policy regarding the Northeast. 
6.  The only detailed information which I have been able to 
find on the "Thai Exiles Group" or "Thai Exiles Associa­
tion" appears , undocumented , in the U. S. Army Area Hand­
book for Thailand (American University 19 63: 384-5). This 
group apparently included several Thai groups living in 
exile in Communist countries. However. , for our interests , 
the most important was the one in Laos: 
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The Association ' s  activities, in the autumn of 
19 6 2  seemed to focus on a plan to unite the North­
eastern Region with Laos. Thai police were 
called on in September to invesetigate reports 
that the exile group in Laos was send�ng some of 
its members into the region to conduct separa­
tists propaganda among the villagers. In Novem­
ber, Minister of the Interior General Praphat
Charusathien asserted that the bulk of the 
exiles do not constitute a serious subversive 
threat, but that a few of them, like Deputy Mini­
ster of Education Tim Buriphat [Thim Phuriphat, 
former MP from Ubon ], do have sufficient prestige
in the Northeastern Region to bear watching. 
(American University 196 3 :  3 8 5 )  
7.  There is good reason to question whether or not a Thai 
"liberation movement" is lead by Northeasterners or has 
any existence independent of the Lao Dong Party in North 
Vietnam or the Pathet Lao in Laos. Noel Battye, in a 
recent survey of press reports on "insurrectionisi'eactivity 
in the Northeast between December 9 ,  19 6 3  ( the death of 
Sarit) and September 1 3 ,  196 6 ,  has found evidence to sup­
port his _conclusion that the leadership of the Thai 
Patriotic Front in China is Central or Souther�erather than 
Northeastern, Thai in origin ( Battye 1 9 6 6 - 7 : 9- 12 ) .  Although
the Than9m government believes that such ex-northeasterner 
MP ' s  as Thim Phuriphat, Saing Marangkun ( Free Democrat,
Buriram) , and Amph9n Suwannabon ( Free Democrat, Rqi-Et)
are leaders of the Thai Patriotic Front/Thailand Inde­
pendence Movement, the names of these men have appeared
rarely in the broadcasts from Radio Hanoi, Radio Peking,
or "The Voice of the Thai People" ( Battye 1 9 6 6 - 7  : 13-14  , 3 8 ) .
The only Northeasterner who has received considerable 
publicity as a "guerrilla leader'' in the Northeast, Yot 
Tisawot ( Ibid. , p. 4 3 0h is a total unknown as far as north­
easetern political activities are concerned. There is a 
growing body of evidence to suggest that many of the 
"insurrectionists" in the Northeast are not Thai citizens, 
but are Chinese or Vietnamese T ' ai or Lao who have been 
sent as a�ents provocat•urs into the region ( Ibid. , pp.3 7-8, 41- , 4S). Recently a few trained indigenous "cadrese" 
who have been arrested by the Thai police in the Northeast 
have revealed that they were trained in a school in North 
Vietnam (Hoa Binh) which they reached through a network 
of Pathet Lao and Vietnamese agents. These same "cadres" 
have also stressed that they were not allowed to know the 
real names of other Thai citizens involved ( Bangkok Post, 
December 2, 19 6 6 )  . Although this latter fact probably
reflects an attempt to prevent the arrest of one man 
leading to the exposure of all the "cadres" working in 
Thailand, it also reveals the absence of recognized "Thai" 
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7. ( continued) 
leaders in charge of the movement. In shorte, it would 
appear from the fragmentary reports which exist that any
movement which might blossom into something comparable 
to the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front does 
not yet exist or if it_ exists , it is not led by anyone
of prominence. Moreover , it seems likely that "insurrec­
tionist" activity in the Northeast is manipulated by 
non-Thai powers. 
8. One of the most realistic appraisals of the development
needs of the Northeast has been made recently by Hans 
Platenius , the World Bank Adviser to the Northeastern 
Development Committee ( Platenius 1963). However , not all 
of his suggestions have been concurred in by others who 
know the region well ( see Harmon 1964). 
9.  Statistics for the 1962  figures were obtained from the 
Bulletin of Statistics ( vol. 1 1 ,  no. 4 ,  September , 1 9 6 3) ,  
p. 38. The 1939 figure is from the Statistical Yearbook 
of the United Nations ( New York , 19 55) , p. 325. 
Chapter VII 
1. The following discussion of "conscious models" is based on 
a very stimulating article by Barbara Ward ( 19 6 5). The 
concept of " Conscious models, "  taken from Levi-Strauss 
( 19 5 3) ,  is introduced by Ward in the following terms: 
✓
• • •  Levi-Strauss • • •  draws attention to the distinc-
tion between culturally produced models and ob­
servers' models. The former , constructs of the 
people under study themselves , he calls conscious 
models ; the latter , unconscious models. Conscious 
models , he points out , may or may not exist for 
any particular phenomenone, may or may not provide
useful insight , but , being part of the facts ( and 
probably among the most significant facts) are in 
any case worthy of study. ( Ward 1965: 113) 
2. For an elaboration on the similarities between Isan and 
Lao village culture and their difference from Central Thai 
village culture, see Keyes ( 19 6 6a:6 2-76). 
3. I witnessed ceremonies in both Isan villages and towns 
in which the picture of the king was linked by means of 
a "sacred cord" to a Buddha image and monks in a merit­
making ceremony. 
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